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Counselor, Gatekeeper, Shareholder, Thief:
Why Attorneys Who Invest in Their Clients in a
Post-Enron World Are "Selling Out,"
Not "Buying In"
CHRISTINE HURT*

In recentyears, many corporate attorneys have tried to function not merely as
legal adviser to their clients, but as business consultants to them, and even as

investors in their enterprises. During the "Dot-Coin" boom of the late-1990s,
this phenomenon led to the widespreadpracticeof lawfirms taking equity in lieu
of or in addition to, their traditionallegalfees. But when a corporateattorney's
financial well-being becomes too closely tied to the success of a transaction in
this way, her ability to exercise her independent professional judgment
regarding the matter can be compromised. Recent financial scandals have
arousedsuspicion of the corporateworld generally, and although public wrath
has thus farfocused primarilyon the misdeeds of accountants and investment
analysts, scrutiny could turn next to the propriety of relationships between
corporations and their attorneys. Professor Hurt argues that, at least in part
because of the prevalent and questionablepracticeof taking equity in lieu offees
from a client, the legal profession is now susceptible to the embarrassmentofan
Enron-likescandal.
The authorfirst describes some of the ways that corporations have sought to
structure legal fee arrangements so that their attorneys are more effective at
achieving results beneficial to the corporation. Then the author examines
traditional understandings of the corporate attorney-client relationship by
focusing on the attorney's roles as transactional cost engineer, reputational
intermediary, and gatekeeper. Next, the author shows how investing in a client
adversely affects an attorney's attempts to fulfill each of these traditionalroles.
Finally, in order to preserve the independence of corporate attorneys and
eliminate any incentive to act unethically, the author suggests that either
regulatory agencies should require disclosure of arrangements whereby
attorneys "buy-in" to their clients' enterprises, or the legal profession itself
should impose more restrictivelimits on this practice.

* Director, Legal Research and Writing, University of Houston Law Center. B.A., Texas
Tech University;, J.D., University of Texas Law School. I am grateful for the able research
assistance of Lori Anderson Twomey and for the continued research support of the University
of Houston Law Center. I would also like to thank Professor Eric Goldman of Marquette
University School of Law for his invaluable comments.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine a painting, or a cartoon poster in a legal gifts catalog,' that depicts
the participants in a corporate transaction. Along with figures representing the
management of the corporation, the painting would include a stable of
professionals: attorneys, accountants, and investment bankers. If this painting
truly reflected a transaction consummated in recent years, those three
professionals would be virtually indistinguishable from one another. Although the
accountant would surely be sitting with his HIP 12C calculator, the investment
banker with his laptop, ready to run the "model" if necessary, and the lawyer with
the now-ubiquitous Blackberry, the three professionals would be giving advice
and guidance on the same array of issues arising fiom the transaction.
Recently, many trends have contributed to attorneys being viewed less as
independent counselors and monitors of corporate behavior and more like
business consultants, partners, and even investors. First, the nature of corporate
transactions has become so complex as to require attorneys to actively create and
structure deals, an activity that transcends the traditional realm of legal advice and
borders on business advice. 2 In addition, the explosion of multi-disciplinary
practice among "Big Five" accounting firms, 3 a phenomenon in which the same
firm will provide auditing, consulting and even legal advice, 4 has caused
attorneys to rethink the bundle of services that attorneys provide. Finally,
corporate clients have recently begun to ask corporate counsel to become partners
with them and forsake the traditional billable hour in lieu of sharing in the risks
5
and rewards of the transactions in which such counsel participates.

I See, for example, "The Closing," item number 1055, at http://www.forcounsel.com (last
visited May 19, 2003), advertising a framed, limited edition lithograph depicting the

"dynamism and energy" in the final moments of closing a financial deal.
2 See Richard W. Painter, The Moral Interdependenceof Corporate Lawyers and Their
Clients, 67 S. CAL. L. REv. 507, 544-45 (1994) (asserting that complex corporate transactions
require creative lawyering that blurs the line between legal and business advice).
3 Prior to the conviction of Arthur Andersen on obstruction of justice charges on July 7,
2002, the Big Five accounting firms were Arthur Andersen, Deloitte & Touche, KPMG, Ernst

& Young, and PriceWaterhouseCoopers. Currently, the remaining large public accounting
firms are referred to as the Big Four.
4 See Peter C. Kostant, Paradigm Regained: How Competition from Accounting Firms
May Help CorporateAttorneys to Recapture the Ethical High Ground,20 PACE L. REV. 43, 44,
48 (1999) (describing accounting firms as providing ta planning, business planning, mergers
and acquisitions consulting advice, and litigation support services).
5 See Paul Marcotte, Designer Billing: Lawyers Use Value Billing, Other Hourly Rate
Alternatives, A.B.A. J., Nov. 1989, at 38, 39 (quoting Shelby Rogers Jr., Senior Vice President
and General Counsel of Texas Commerce Bancshares, Inc., as saying: "Law firms that are
willing to experiment, willing to be innovative, will participate in that reallocation. Firms that
are not willing to be innovative will not participate.").
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Wanting outside counsel to become more accountable and wanting legal fees
to correlate more directly to the creation of value, corporate clients have been
asking or allowing outside law firms to "buy in" to the clients' immediate
objectives, such as the acquiring of an asset, launching an initial public offering,
consummating a merger, or securing financing. 6 To secure this type of loyalty
and interdependence, clients, particularly growth-oriented start-up companies,
have begun to ask outside counsel to accept part or all of its legal fee as equity in
the client company. 7 At the height of the technology boom, some Silicon Valley
firms required equity investment opportunities in addition to standard hourly
fees. 8 Made culturally acceptable by its widespread use in Silicon Valley,
investing in clients is swiftly becoming standard practice for many law firms. 9
These law firms view themselves as not just corporate counsel, but also strategic
business partners who advise clients on legal and business matters.10
This trend in the legal profession of becoming lawyer, business consultant,
and venture capitalist for a client mirrored similar trends in the accounting
industry, and both were amiably moving toward becoming more like the
investment banking industry and toward a holistic transaction nirvana when one
of the largest corporate scandals in recent history forced attorneys and
accountants alike to reexamine their traditional roles and their relationships with
their clients. In the fall of 2001, Enron Corp. publicly announced that it would
take massive charges against earnings and restate its financial statements for the
prior four years because of accounting errors. I During the deluge of reports of
mismanagement, self-dealing, creative accounting and disclosure problems,
fingers began pointing at both the accountants involved and the outside

6 See Peter D. Zeughauser, The Use of Alternative Fee Arrangements to Achieve Smart
Results and Improve Outside Counsel Relationships,871 PLI/CORP. 47, 54 (1994) (stating that
clients want an attorney to "put his or her money where his or her mouth is").
7 See Debra Baker, Who Wants to Be a Millionaire?, A.B.A. J., Feb. 2000, at 36, 39
(reporting that some clients demand attorney investment as a "show of loyalty").
8 See infra Part III.

9 See Baker, supra note 7, at 39 (remarking that taking equity in clients is "standard
operating procedure" in Silicon Valley).
10 See id. at 41 (quoting Craig Johnson, founder of Venture Law Group, as saying: "Think
of VLG as a combination of a very good corporate/securities law firm, a consulting firm, a
venture capital fund and an investment bank, and you'll be close to what we really do"); D.M.
Osborne, When Is a Law Firm Not a Law Firm?, INC., May 1, 1998, at 82 (profile of VLG).
11 The SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE COMM. OF THE BD. OF DIRS. OF ENRON CORP., REPORT OF

INVESTIGATION, 2002 WL 198018, at *9 (Feb. 1, 2002) [hereinafter ENRON REPORT] (detailing
how on October 16, 2001, Enron reported it would take a $544 million after-tax charge against
earnings and a $1.2 billion reduction of shareholder equity, followed by a complete restatement
of financial statements from 1997 to 2001 that reduced reported net income by hundreds of
millions of dollars).
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attorneys. 1 2 These groups were named in lawsuits against Enron Corp. and its
officers.' 3 In addition, Arthur Andersen, one of the most venerable of the large,
public accounting frms, was convicted in June 2002 of obstruction of justice for
shredding documents related to Enron Corp.' 4 Suddenly, investors, legislators,
and regulators have begun scrutinizing these third-party professionals 15 with a
zeal reminiscent of the fallout after the savings and loan scandals of the late
1980s. 16 Legislation has been introduced and passed in an attempt to make both
accountants and attorneys more independent ftom clients.' 7 This new-found
suspicion of interdependence has even led to scrutiny of investment banks,
8
brokers, and analysts.'
In the aftermath of the Enron scandals, the legal profession must reexamine
how closely connected it should be to its corporate clients. Certainly the public
has begun to question the activities of attorneys as well as accountants and

12 See John C. Coffee, Jr., Adolph A. Berle & Joseph Flom, The Enron Debacle and
Gatekeeper Liability: Why Would the Gatekeepers Remain Silent?, available at 2001 WL
1727278 (testimony submitted to Sen. Comm. on Commerce, Science & Transportation, Dec.
18, 2001) [hereinafter Coffee, Berle & Flor Testimony] (focusing on actions of Enron's
outside auditors, Arthur Andersen, LLP); see also Ellen Joan Pollock, Enron Lawyers Face
Congress over Their Role, WALL ST. J., Mar. 15, 2002, at C13 (focusing on Enron's outside
counsel, Vinson & Elkins, LLP).
13 Tittle v. Enron Corp., No. 01 -CV-3913 (S.D. Tex. filed Nov. 13, 2001).
14 See Penelope Patsuris, Andersen Clients Evacuate Post-Verdict,FORBES, July 22, 2002,
available at http://www.forbes.com/2002/03/13/03l3andersen.html (commenting on the June
7, 2002 criminal verdict against Arthur Andersen in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Texas).
15 See Jason Hoppin, Coalition Is Seeking Aid and Abet Liability for Lawyers,
Accountants, RECORDER (San Francisco), May 22, 2002, at 1.
16 See generally David B. Wilkins, Making Context Count: Regulating Lawyers After
Kaye, Scholer, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1145 (1993) (chronicling the renewed interest in legal ethics
following lawsuits by the Office of Thrift Supervision against attorneys involved in failed
savings and loans).
17 See, e.g., Investor Protection Act of 2002, S. 1933, 107th Cong. (2002) (introduced by
Sen. Richard C. Shelby (R.-Ala.)).
18 See, e.g., Michael Schroeder & Randall Smith, MassachusettsProbe into CFSB Funds
Pressure on Stock Analysts, WALL ST. J., Sept. 6, 2002, at Cl (detailing investigations into
Credit Suisse First Boston's analysts' practices by Massachusetts securities regulators, the New
York Attorney General, the SEC, and the National Association of Securities Dealers); Charles
Gasparino, NASD Plans to File Charges Against Salomon, Grudman, WALL ST. J., Sept. 20,
2002, at Al (reporting on the NASD's investigation of conflicts of interest arising from
Salomon & Smith Barney's relationship with Winstar Communications, Inc., and research
analyst Jack Grubman's research reports on the same company); Randall Smith & Charles
Gasparino, Analyst Inquiry May Cost Wall Street up to $2 Billion, WALL ST. J., Oct. 28, 2002,
at Cl (predicting that investigations by the New York attorney general and the SEC into
investment banks' independent stock research reports could lead to an unprecedented legal
settlement).
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analysts that are perceived to be too close to their clients. The legal profession
must then decide what is the proper rule of a corporate attorney. Is an outside
attorney a gatekeeper? A counselor? A monitor? An advocate? Can a corporate
attorney adequately maintain the balance between independent counsel and
business partner when his financial well-being is closely tied to the
consummation of a client's proposed transaction and the performance of a client's
stock? Even if the most ethical attorney could ignore her own economic interests,
to the outside world this interest makes the entire transaction or representation
suspect. By "buying in," an attorney can easily be seen as "selling out."
Therefore, the legal profession should take steps to restore the independence of
corporate attorneys by instituting and enforcing rules either prohibiting or
disclosing these conflicts of interest before the legal profession suffers the same
reputational disaster now plaguing the accounting industry.
Section HI will briefly outline the recent growth of alternative fee
arrangements in the legal profession and the rationales behind them. Section InI
will further spotlight the recent rise of attorneys investing in their clients,
particularly in the Silicon Valley in the late 1990s. Section IV of this article will
detail the historical roles of corporate attorney and client, in particular the roles of
transaction cost engineer, reputational intermediary, and gatekeeper, and Section
V will discuss whether these equity investments help or hinder an attorney in
fulfilling the roles of transaction cost engineer, reputational intermediary, and
gatekeeper. Section VI will discuss how both the appearance and existence of
conflicts in the attorney's fulfillment of these roles can lead to increased liability
for malpractice, breach of fiduciary duty, and securities fraud. Section VII will
compare the trends in the legal profession with the rise and fall of
multidisciplinary practice in the accounting profession, and Section VIII will
propose that either the legal profession institute rules that prohibit the practice of
attorneys investing in clients or that other regulatory agencies institute rules that
require disclosure of such arrangements. Section IX will conclude that members
of the practicing bar should avoid the economic pressure to act like investment
bankers or venture capitalists and restore independence to the legal profession.

II. THE ULTIMATE CARROT: ATTORNEYS' FEES
This article will explore the proper roles of a corporate attorney and whether
investing in a client enhances or impairs the ability of the attorney to fulfill those
roles. An attorney's motivation and ability to function in these roles are closely
tied to the ability to and method of charging a fee for those functions. Therefore, a
brief discussion of how clients have sought to make attorneys more effective in
these roles through alternative fee arrangements is necessary.
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A. Background
The debate over how to value legal services is as old as the legal profession
itself. In early Rome, legal advocates contributed their services free of charge and
laws were passed against the peddling of legal services for monetary gain.' 9 Even
after Emperor Claudius issued a decree allowing for the payment of legal fees up
to a maximum amount, an attorney did not have a right to collect those fees if the
client declined to pay. 20 Although attorneys' fees in the United States are
definitely a matter of course and both blessed and prescribed by law, attorneys,
especially attorneys at large law firms, are still loath to discuss the matter of fees
with clients. 2 1 Although most lawyers have new clients sign representation
agreements, lawyers prefer not to focus on fee matters when counseling clients,
much like a physician treats a patient in an examination room without any
mention of the cost of the office visit. Because of the desire to be part of a
profession, not a vocation, many attorneys in this century have avoided talking
about fees until the end of a representation and then simply have sent a bill for
'22
"legal services rendered.
In the latter half of this century, hourly billing became the convention among
most U.S. attorneys. 23 The practice has been an integral part of life at traditional
law firms where leveraged young associates, hoping to one day be partners, used
to toil for the benefit of current partners on work steadily and loyally provided by
long-term clients. However, this type of law practice is slowly vanishing from the
horizon.

19

See Geoffrey Furlonger, Time for Business-Lawyers to Stop Billing Time?, in BEYOND

THE BILLABLE HOUR: AN ANTHOLOGY OF ALTERNATMz BILLING METHODS 93, 93 (Richard

C.

Reed ed., 1989).
20 Id. In England, this legal oddity still continues and contingency fees are considered
champertous and illegal. Id. Perhaps this attitude is why the "English Rule," wherein the loser
in litigation pays all fees, is so popular. Why should innocent parties, forced to retain counsel,
pay for those services?
21 See Robert E. Litan & Steven C. Salop, Reforming the Lawyer-Client Relationship
Through Alternative Billing Methods, 77 JUDICATURE 191, 191 (1994) ("The topic of legal fees
once was one of those subjects lawyers didn't discuss in polite company.").
22 See Charles S. McCowan, Jr. & Esteban Herrera, Jr., Alternative Fee Arrangements:
Time for Consideration, 43 LA. B.J. 466, 466 (1996) (stating that historically, clients were
presented with a one-page invoice that said only "for legal services rendered").
23 See generally, William G. Ross, The Ethics of Hourly Billing by Attorneys, 44 RUTGERS
L. REV. 1, 6-12 (1991) (chronicling the history of attorneys' fees from the Roman empire to the
abolition of minimum fixed fee schedules in the United States and the rise of hourly billing in
the 1960s).

2003]

COUNSELOR, GATEKEEPER, SHAREHOLDER, THIEF

B. Who Moved My Fee? The ChangingLegal Industry
1. The Client's Point of View
In the last twenty years, however, the legal industry has changed. The profile
of the industry evolved from one of stable, homogenous law firms servicing longstanding, loyal clients to an industry in which lawyers, both associates 24 and
partners, 25 move easily between law firms. Clients began moving even easier,
moving from long-term relationships with law firms to project-specific
relationships with many firms.26 More disturbingly, some clients even began
shopping around for legal services,27 asking attorneys to make proposals 28 for
certain types of legal work and to compete with cross-downtown rivals. Clients
became consumers; legal services became a consumer good.
As clients began to see legal services as a product, clients began to question
the use of the billable hour to calculate the value of that product. Clients do not
buy cars or computers based on the number of hours spent to create that car or
computer. In fact, flat pricing of such products has led manufacturers to shorten
the amount of hours necessary to create the product. Business clients who had
become indoctrinated with the theory of "total quality management" wanted

24

See Litan & Salop, supra note 21, at 193 (stating that the 1980s marked the beginning
of attorney exodus and decreased firm loyalty).
(describing lateral movement of partners between firms); see also Richard B.
25 See id.
Schmitt, Miller to Leave Weil Gotshal, WALL ST. J., July 10, 2002, at C4, available at 2002
WL 3400234 (reporting the departure of Harvey R. Miller from the department he created at
Weil, Gotshal & Manges to an investment banking boutique, joining leagues of lawyers who
have "doubled or tripled their income" by making the same move).
26
See Litan & Salop, supra note 21, at 193-94 (making a connection between corporate
merger frenzy and the "major reshuffling of legal relationships"). The next logical step was the
unthinkable: law firms began to merge, reshuffling clients and practice areas even more. See
Wendy M. Becker et al., Lawyers Get Down to Business, MCKINSEY Q., Mar. 22, 2001, at 45
(describing the mega law firm mergers of 2000 and noting how these restructurings disrupted
long-standing attomey-client relationships).
27 See Edward Felsenthal & Paul M. Barrett, Clients and Changing Times Rein in
Runaway Legal Fees, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRm., June 13, 1998, at A22 (detailing the process by
which Charter Behavioral Health Systems reduced legal expenses 35% by holding a "beauty
contest" among ten law firms before choosing Alston & Bird to handle its medical malpractice
defense cases).
28
-SeePeter D. Zeughauser, PreparingSuccessful Responses to Requests for Proposals,in
WIN-WIN BILLING STRATEGIES: ALTERNATIVES THAT SATISFY YOUR CLIENTS AND You 211
(Richard C. Reed ed., 1992) (providing ideas for drafting bids in "beauty contests" where
clients evaluate and choose outside counsel for a specific transaction).
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outside legal counsel to undergo the same metamorphosis and become lean, mean
29
legal machines.
In addition, clients wanted to bring the legal vendors into the management
team. Although large companies created substantial in-house legal departments, 30
most companies continued also to use outside law firms for specific projects. 31
The traditional representation had entailed the corporate client virtually giving the
attorney a blank checkbook and the attorney det.rmining in what ways and how
quickly the checks were to be spent, 32 but now clients became intent on ensuring
that the motivations of outside counsel were aligned with the motivations of the
clients. At worst, clients were concerned that hourly billing gave outside counsel
the opportunity to misrepresent actual time spent on projects and thus to overbill
for services. 33 At best, clients were very suspicious that hourly fees incentivized
even the most honest lawyers to spend more time: on projects than necessary; take
on ancillary projects that had little marginal utility; anticipate and complete
projects that were never used; staff projects with more lawyers than necessary;
and, for training purposes, layer projects with inexperienced lawyers supervised
by other lawyers. 3 4 Hourly fees did not motivate attorneys to consider the benefit
to the client of each hour worked in relation to the cost to the client of each
35
hour.
29

See RICHARD C. REED, BILLING INNOVATIONS: NEW WIN-WIN WAYS TO END HOURLY

BILLING 83-84 (1996) (noting that companies that applied TQM techniques to other
departments eventually focused those techniques on the legal department, pressuring managers

to reduce the legal budget and to improve the return on that budget).
30

See Mary C. Daly, The Cultural, Ethical, and Legal Challenges in Layweringfor a

Global Organization: The Role of the General Counsel, 46 EMORY L.J. 1057, 1059 (reporting
that between 1962 and 1982, the number of in-house lawyers quadrupled, and that from 1980 to
1991, the number increased by 33%, an increase that rtirrored corporate managers' desire to
have attorneys with a more intimate knowledge of their businesses).
31 See id. at 1061-62 (noting that one of the main functions of in-house attorneys is to
monitor outside counsel).
32 See Stephen W. Jones & Melissa Beard Glovcr, The Attack on Traditional Billing
Practices,20 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 293, 293 (1998) ("Clients may not know exactly
what type of billing they want, but they know exactly what they do not want-a billing method
that gives the attorney the ability to determine the costs with no added incentive for the attorney
to be efficient with the clients' resources.").
33 See Litan & Salop, supra note 21, at 192 n.5 (citing a survey that concluded that 56% of
corporate counsel respondents believed that outside counsel inflated hours on invoices).
34
See id. at 192 (detailing examples of attorney tasks and staffing methods a fully
informed client would not condone).
35 See id. (recognizing that although attorneys do not discuss this mindset, clients
"routinely attempt to make tradeoffs between the costs of legal services and the quality of
work"). Again, attorneys like to think of themselves as legal physicians. Most attorneys would
not expect a physician to suggest a low-cost course of treatment that was in any way less
effective than the optimal course of treatment.
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The first technique clients used to make outside counsel more responsive to
client objectives was monitoring, a technique historically used by principals to
36
ensure that their agents use firm resources to advance the goals of the principal.
Basic monitoring may have already been instituted by in-house legal counsel who
supervised the outside law firms. 37 Advanced monitoring, in the form of auditing
detailed billing statements and outcomes, 38 proved to be very time-consuming
and costly, and many times the effort expended outweighed the benefit derived
39
from the monitoring.
Although monitoring led to some reforms, some corporate clients remained
unconvinced that outside counsel were efficiently supervising their legal budgets.
Even if law firms had to submit heavily documented invoices, "timekeepers"
became adept at wording tasks in those invoices so as not to raise flags with
reviewers of those invoices. 40 Moreover, monitoring had its shortcomings; even if
the bill was an accurate reflection of the time spent on a project, that time may not
have been spent efficiently. 4 1 Clients then resorted to another strategy that ownershareholders use to align the interests of managers: compensation schemes.42 By
36 See id. at 192-93 (describing the client-attomey relationship as analogous to another
principal-agent relationship, the one between shareholders of a firm and management, and
comparing monitoring techniques used in each to solve the "moral hazard" problem).
37 See REED, supra note 29, at 84 (describing changes that occurred during the recession
of the late 1980s and early 1990s to cut costs that resulted in a situation in which "outside
lawyers who previously had dealt with the president of the corporation (who may not have been
a lawyer) now found themselves dealing with general counsel who knew exactly how the
hourly billing game was played").
38 See Litan & Salop, supra note 21, at 193 (describing how some companies hired thirdparty auditors to review invoices).
39 See id. (warning that excessive micro-management and second-guessing of outside
counsel wastes both client and attorney resources and destroys the trust necessary for a
successful relationship). However, many changes in the legal profession are a definite
outgrowth of client monitoring. Some notable client audits shed light on some billing practices
that had long gone unnoticed: two attorneys in the same firm both billing the client for
interoffice conferences with each other; billing several clients for the same time spent
performing the same task; billing one client for working on its file while simultaneously
traveling for and billing a second client; and charging a premium for services such as copying,
catering, word processing, and faxing. See Sonia S. Chan, Note, ABA Formal Opinion 93-379:
Double Billing, Paddingand Other Formsof Overbilling,9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICs 611, 633-35
(1996) (chronicling how Citicorp forced its outside counsel to reform its billing practices).
Court battles and media attention surrounding these audited fee statements made corporate
clients demand that law firms reform their own practices. See Felsenthal & Barrett, supra note
27 (describing how one client stopped tolerating the industry practice of inflating such charges).
40 See Chan, supranote 39, at 624 (noting that attorneys will always be able to justify time
spent because attorneys are masters at rationalization).
41 See Litan & Salop, supra note 21, at 193.
42
See WILLIAM A. KLEIN & JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., BuSINESS ORGANIZATION AND
FINANCE 169-70 (8th ed. 2002) (describing executive compensation schemes such as
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changing the method of calculating legal fees, clients could better ensure that
outside counsel were using client resources to achieve client goals in the most
43
efficient manner.
2. The Attorney's Point of View
As clients began to question the billable hour as a method of determining
value of legal services, technological and cultural developments caused attorneys
to question hourly billing as well. Research that had taken days now took hours
on an electronic database, such as Westlaw or LEXIS-Nexis. 44 Common court
documents that had previously taken hours to create from whole cloth could now
be prepared in minutes by retrieving those same documents prepared for other
clients from a firm's network database. 4 5 Even large, negotiated contracts could
be roughed out quickly by electronically revising "precedents," or similar
documents used in prior transactions. 46 At first, attorneys began to use technology
to enable them to increase billable hours. A quick reproduction of research that
had taken thirty hours last month for a different client was again billed out at
thirty hours for the new client.47 Law firms began passing on technological costs,
such as fees charged by electronic databases, faxing and copying at a high
premium.48 However, clients protested these "irnovations," 49 and in the case of
compensatory stock options and golden parachutes as methods used to align the interests of
managers with the interests of shareholders).
43 See Litan & Salop, supra note 21, at 194 (noting that certain alternative billing methods
may encourage attorneys to "internalize the sensitivity to cost" of the client); REED, supra note
29, at 89 (reporting that Peter D. Zeughauser, general counsel of the Irvine Company, was "[a]
realist" and "keenly aware that the choice of billing methods can be used to align the interest of
the client and outside counsel").
44 Linda J. Ravdin & Kelly J.Capps, Alternative Pricingof Legal Services in a Domestic
Relations Practice:Choices & Ethical Considerations,33 FAM. L.Q. 387, 388 (1999) (stating
that technology has reduced the time required to produce many documents).
45 See Lee A. Watson, Communication, Honesty, and Contract: Three Buzzwords for
MaintainingEthical Hourly Billing, II GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 189, 193 (describing billing for
recycled work as unethical).
46
See Bradley A. Ullrick, The Alternative Billing Diner: Serving up a New Billing Scheme
for the Technological Age, 5 SPG J. TECH. L. & POL' 2, 14-15 (2000) (characterizing new
technology that enables attorneys in a law firm to share and reproduce work product as creating
a billing dilemma).
47 See id. at 25 (noting that ABA Formal Opinion 93-379 was an effort to eliminate
practices such as recycling work product).
48 See Jones & Glover, supra note 32, at 298-99 (describing the conundrum faced by an
attorney incurring additional expenses for doing online research that reduces the number of
billable hours required to perform a task who cannot pass on those costs to the client).
49
See id.
at 300 ("[M]any companies flatly refuse to pay for internal costs such as copying
or online research.").
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double-billing, the courts supported their protests.50 Attorneys then raised the
hourly rates, but again rates could only increase a certain amount before clients
voiced concern. 5 1 Some attorneys began to realize that technology was making
them more efficient, but less profitable at the same time. 52 Only by changing the
hourly billing method could attorneys profit from being technologically
53
efficient.
In addition, as more attorneys searched for a better lifestyle and a balance
with work and family, the controlling billable hour proved to be an obstacle. If the
only way to increase one's income was to increase the number of hours worked,
then an attorney's income was effectively capped. The billing method that had
created a lucrative profession was in danger of sentencing the same profession to
a never-ending accumulation of more and more hours worked.
3. Trial and Error
In addition, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, times of corporate belttightening, clients began to demand alternative billing arrangements, such as flat
fee billing, contingent fees, and hybrid arrangements tailored to specific legal
work. Some law firms were quick to adapt, 54 but most were more reluctant to
abandon the reliable source of steady income, the billable hour. 55 Part of this
intransigence probably stemmed from attorneys' hesitance to discuss fees with
clients at all. Proposing an alternative fee would, at the very least, require a

50 See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof I Responsibility, Formal Op. 93-379 (1993)
[hereinafter 1993 ABA Op.] ("The practice of billing several clients for the same time or work
product, since it results in the earning of an unreasonable fee, therefore is contrary to the
mandate of the Model Rules.").
51 See Ravdin & Capps, supra note 44, at 387-88 (hypothesizing that hourly billing rates
cannot be increased much more for the sake of profitability). In addition, if a lawyer's hourly
rate is raised to account for technological efficiencies, some hours spent in an old-fashioned
way will be overpriced, such as hours spent in a deposition or negotiating a document. See id. at
390.
52 See also Becker et al., supra note 26, at 49 (hypothesizing that technology such as
Westlaw and LEXIS-Nexis allowed for "low-value-added" legal work to be shifted away from
large law firms).
53 See Ravdin & Capps, supra note 44, at 390 (stating that straight hourly billing
undervalues the attorney's efficiency and investment in technology).
54 See McCowan & Herrera, supra note 22, at 466 (encouraging lawyers to consider
alternative fees to be competitive in a buyer's market).
55 See Wendy R. Liebowitz, Not Snow, Nor Sleet, Not Gadget Boom Will Kill the Billable
Hour, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 31, 1998, at B13 (reporting that although analysts predicted that
technology would cause attorneys to abandon hourly billing, inertia and fear keep most
attorneys loyal to the billable hour).
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conversation about fees. 56 In addition, many older law firms would see changing
the fee structure as acknowledging that they are in a commercial business of
providing legal services; no longer could they operate under the legal fiction that
lawyers provide legal services as a public service and that grateful clients then
reward those lawyers by paying a gratuitous fee. 57 However, some law firms,
both newer, smaller law firms and more innovative established firms, thrived in
this market by offering alternatives to their current clients and by attracting new
clients with a more "value-based" billing approach. 58
Attorneys experimented with many alternative billing approaches, including
contingent fees, reverse contingent fees, flat fees, value billing, and hybrid
approaches that combined one or more of these alternatives with hourly billing.
Each billing system has its own inherent problems.5 9 Each practice, like hourly
billing, will have a tendency, in certain scenarios, to create a conflict of interest in
the motivations of outside counsel and the client. 60 Contingent fees, although
accepted in most types of litigation, 6 1 can create conflicts in the transactional
realm if the transactions are large and time-intensive and the entire fee is
contingent on the closing of the transaction. 62 Contingent fees can work,
however, if the outside attorney has numerous small transactions for the same
client.63 Although flat fees are beneficial to the client because legal costs will be
56 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUcT R. 1.5(b), (c) (1984) (requiring fee arrangements
with clients other than long-term clients to be agreed upon at the beginning of a representation,
preferably in writing, and requiring all contingent fee agreements to be in writing).
57 See Jason M. Klein, No Foolfor a Client: The Finance and Incentives Behind StockBased Compensationfor CorporateAttorneys, 1999 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 329, 357 (noting
that lawyers will become more willing to consider altemative billing arrangements when
lawyers are willing to talk about fees and accept that the practice of law is a business).
58 See Marcotte, supra note 5, at 38 (noting that Stephen Susman, LLP, a name partner in
a very successful Houston-based firm, employs four types of billing methods).
59
See Ravdin & Capps, supra note 44, at 415 (stating frankly that any billing system will
be arbitrary to some degree and will be able to be abused by unethical lawyers).
60
See id. (noting that although hourly billing methods create an incentive for attorneys to
perform unnecessary work, flat and contingent fees give attorneys incentives to perform the
least work, and the client's motivations are equally opposite and misguided for each).
61 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDucT R. 1.5(d) (prohibiting contingent fees in certain
representations, such as domestic relations and criminal defense).
62 See Furlonger, supra note 19, at 97 (noting that the quicker a transaction is closed, the
more likely it is that the corporate lawyer did not fulfill her duty to protect her client and also
noting that the more substantial the contingent portion of the fee, the more likely an corporate
attorney will be to ignore potentially problematic issues that arise in the transaction).
63 ABA Comm. on Lawyer Bus. Ethics, Business & Ethics Implications of Alternative
Billing Practices:Report on Alternative Billing Arrangements, 54 Bus. LAw. 175, 185 (1998)
(advising that contingent fees for transactional matters can be economically feasible if the
attorney is engaged in numerous projects for the client and if some of those projects are likely to
successfully close).
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predictable, 64 if the assumptions made in calculating that fee fail, then either the
65
client or the attorney will have a windfall, and the other may incur a hardship.
Value billing, where the client and attorney agree to a fee based on the value
added by the attorney, was not realistic for clients who need predictable legal
66
costs and do not wish to spend a lot of time negotiating with outside counsel.
Some hybrid arrangements, with certain phases of representation being performed
for a fixed fee, with some portion of the fee contingent on performance, have
67
worked successfully for some parties.
I1. THE NEW, NEW THING
A. Buddy, Can You Spare a Million?
During this transitional period, the economy changed. All of a sudden in the
1990s, the richest individuals in the United States were not lawyers and doctors,
but entrepreneurs. The technology boom ushered in the New Economy, where an
ordinary person with an idea in the garage could become a millionaire, then a
billionaire. 6 8 Almost everyone knew someone (or knew someone who knew
someone) who had become rich with the new currency: stock options. 69 In days,
or hours, or minutes, someone who held stock options in a company launching an

64 See REED, supra note 29, at 89 (citing the ABA Section of Litigation's Committee on
Corporate Counsel surveys, which indicate that most clients are willing to pay a premium in
exchange for a predictable fee).
65 See Furlonger, supra note 19, at 97 (noting that if either party's assumptions are wrong,
then one party may have windfall profits, the client may refuse to pay the bill, or the attorney
may be underpaid).
66 See id. ("[I]t is preferable from the client's point of view to be aware of legal costs
before the actual provision of legal services, rather than receive an unpleasant surprise
following the completion of the lawyer's task.").
67 See id.
68 One of the entrepreneurs most frequently mentioned is Michael Dell, who dropped out
of college in 1984 to found Dell Computer from his home. In 2000, Dell Computer was listed
as the United States' largest computer seller, and Mr. Dell was reported as having a net worth of
$16 billion. The Forbes 400, FORBES, Oct. 9, 2000, at 185. Fellow Texans in Austin who were
enriched by buying Dell stock earned the name "Dellionaires." See Winners & Losers of '98,
WALL ST. J., Dec. 30, 1998, at TI (reporting that in 1998, Dell Computer stock increased in
value 255%); see also David Howard, Dot-Corn Scams, SMART BUS. FROM ZDWIRE, Sept. 1,
2000, 2000 WL 2000520 ("[T]he home runs being hit by these technological companies have
got just about everybody in the U.S. trying to figure out how to become a billionaire.").
69
See Francy Blackwood, Lawyers Take Long View and Put Stock in Clients, S.F. Bus.
TIMES, June 16, 2000, at 22 (referring to stock options as "coin of the realm" and "the New
Economy Currency").
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initial public offering ("IPO") could see those options become worth millions. 70
The new economic input became not time, not knowledge, not even value, but
risk. If someone was willing to take risk, then that person could benefit greatly.
This shift in the economy, added to the fact that law firm revenues were
beginning to falter, 71 resulted in attorneys suddenly becoming much less wealthy
than their clients. 72 Clients who had shown up months before in blue jeans with
nothing but a patent or a website were now far richer than most attorneys could
ever become. Law firms saw associates, and even partners, lured away to start-up
73
companies by the promise of stock options and cutting-edge legal work.
Attorneys suddenly realized an economic truth: if income is based on the number
of hours worked multiplied by a certain number, then income is forever
restricted.74 A day has only so many hours, after all. In addition, attorneys were
energized by the exciting technology boom and wanted to become more involved
in the business side of bringing companies to the capital markets. 75 Attorneys saw
even accounting firms expand into business consulting and begin enjoying the
lucrative buzz of wheeling and dealing. 76 Silicon Valley attorneys, who had
strong ties to both the venture capital and entrepreneur community in that region,

70

See Joseph 1. Rosenbaum, Dot-Corn Crash Ha Not Erased Legal Work, N.Y. L.J.,
Sept. 17, 2001, at S3 (describing "the seeming ease with which one could become an IPO
(Initial Public Offering) millionaire with a dollar and a dream").
71 See Felsenthal & Barrett, supra note 27 (stating that law firm revenues showed little
growth after large increases during the 1980s).
72 See id. (describing attorneys as becoming "bit players in the economy"); Jeff Manning,
Ethics & Economics: The Technology Boom Entices Many Lawyers into Becoming
Shareholders as Well as Advisers to Corporate Clients, but Such Arrangements Raise Worries,
Stock, PORTLAND OREGONIAN, Feb. 27, 2000, at Cl (assigning to young associates the notion
that their six-figure salaries were "chump change" compared to "stock-option windfalls enjoyed
by young turks of technology").
73 Even in-house counsel, whom lawyers in private firms have generally considered to
have traded in long hours for lower pay and prestige, were becoming millionaires overnight.
See Adam Lashinsky, Silicon Valley: The Lawyers Got Screwed Too, FORTUNE, May 27, 2002,
at 133, 136 (telling the story of an entry-level associate and a partner who left Cooley Godward
to be in-house lawyers at eBay and then became millionaires, in the case of ex-partner turned
general counsel, seventy-five times over).
74
See id. (citing Mark Tanoury of Cooley Godward as realizing that increasing fees from
an average of $200 to $300 an hour was not moving the firm any closer to sharing in the
economic boom of Silicon Valley).
75 See Mark C. Suchman & Mia L. Cahill, The Hired Gun as Facilitator: Lawyers and the
Suppression of Business Disputes in Silicon Valley, 21 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 679, 692-93
(1996).
76
See Nikhil Deogun & Elizabeth MacDonald, Winning by the Numbers: Bean Counters
Now Figure Big in Merger-Advisory Game, WALL ST. J., Feb. 10, 2000, at C I (reporting that in
1999, KPMG International advised on more mergers and acquisitions than any other firm,
including investment banking giants Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, and Merrill Lynch).
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were uniquely situated to offer more for their clients than just legal services.77

Attorneys suddenly became much more interested in partnering with their clients
78
and in taking part of their clients' risk in return for the possibility of a payoff.
Now attorneys added a new pricing mechanism to the table: equity.
The technology boom of the 1990s altered law firms' conservative outlook
on investing in clients. 79 In certain areas of the country, particularly Northern
California and the Pacific West Coast, law firms began being very aggressive
about accepting, 80 and in some cases demanding 81 equity from new clients. The
four law firms mentioned most often as accepting equity in clients are Venture
Law Group ("VLG"), 82 Wilson, Sonsini, Goodrich & Rosati, 83 Brobeck, Phleger
& Harrison LLP,84 and Cooley Godward LLP. 85 In most cases, the clients being
accepted under this type of arrangement were start-up companies that would

77 See Suchman & Cahill, supra note 75, at 700 (ascribing the success of Silicon Valley
firms in retooling as business consultants to their knowledge of the informal business norms of
venture capital funds in that region).
78 See Manning, supra note 72 (stating that law firms implemented ambitious investment
programs to share in the technology-generated economic boom); Krischer Goodman, Some
Entrepreneursare Replacing Cash with Equity If 7zen Seeking Legal Help, SAN DIEGO UNIONTRIM., June 11, 2000, at 13 (noting that attorneys realize that billing by the hour does not allow a
law firm to share in any economic upside).
79 See Howard, supra, note 68 ("[T]he equity windfalls have been substantial enough to
prompt most firms to soften or throw out their rules against investments in clients."); Lashinsky,
supra note 73, at 136 (reporting that in 1999, Cooley Godward adopted a policy requiring startup clients to make up to one percent of their equity available to the firm in pre-IPO stock in
addition to its regular fees).
80
See Scott Wooley, Law Firm Takes Equiy in Lieu of Fees, ORANGE Co. Bus. J., Dec.
14, 1993, at 3 (describing Palmieri, Tyler, Wiener, Wilhelm & Waldron as one of two law firms
who were making a habit of accepting client equity).
81 See Lashinsky, supra note 73, at 136; Susan Beck, In Silicon Valley Dealmaker Mark
Tanoury's World, the Companies are Tiny, the Payoffs are Enormous, and the Clients Begfor
Attention, AM. LAW., Apr. 2000, at 64 (reporting Mark Tanoury of Cooley Godward as stating
that at a minimum, the firm required equity from new clients).
82 See About Venture Law Group, Venture Law Group, at http://www.vlg.com/About (last
visited May 19, 2003) (flashing its slogan, "From tiny acorns, mighty oaks grow").
83 See Homepage, Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati, at http://www.wsgr.com (last
visited May 19, 2003) ("Your strategic business partner.").
84 See Why Brobeck?, Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison LLP, at http://www.brobeck.com/
whybrobeck (last visited Mar. 14, 2003) ("Clients benefit from creative billing arrangements
and access to their attorneys around the clock.").
85 See Overview, Cooley Codward LLP, at http://www.cooley.com/firmprofile__
content.ixe?section=Overview (last visited Mar. 14, 2003) ("We are counselors, strategists and
advocates for today's and tomorrow's leaders of the New Economy.").
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eventually engage in an IPO. 86 During a time when these law firms had more
than enough business and were turning away clients, lawyers evaluated clients on
the equity offered and the "upside" of that equity. 87 At the height of the IPO
bubble, even law firms representing the venture capital players in an IPO were
88
requiring stock of the issuer as compensation.
This hunger for equity was not generalized; attorneys were not asking
89
Fortune 500 companies for equity instead of or in addition to attorneys' fees.
Equity is a currency that is only valuable if you buy low, sell high. Asking for
$50,000 worth of GE stock instead of a legal fee is possibly prudent, but very
conservative. The same stock will be worth $50,000 plus a modest increase next
year. However, asking for $50,000 worth of stock options or founders stock from
90
a company that is in the start-up phase is risky, but potentially very lucrative.
Therefore, the law firms that engage in this practice of investing in clients focus
on start-up clients who are working toward an initial public offering or possibly
being acquired by a large competitor, 9 1 not traditional Fortune 500 companies
who need someone to do a I0-Q or a private placement.
From the client's perspective, having outside attorneys as investors seems to
make sense. 92 The attorney would have the same motivations as the client liaison
in seeing the company's goals come to fruition. lIn a start-up scenario, the liaison
contacting the attorney is usually a founder, the owner who started the company,
and is in some ways acting as both principal and agent. The only other principals
may be co-founders or investors such as friends and family. The liaison's goals
are aligned with the company's goals. Having an attorney as an investor seems to
align the attorney's goals with that of both the liaison and the company and

86

See About Venture Law Group, Venture Law Group, at http://www.vlg.com/About (last
visited May 19, 2003) ("We have helped hundreds of prominent technology companies get
started, funded and grow and then go public or be acquired.").
87 See Beck, supra note 81, at 66 (quoting Mark Tanoury of Cooley Godward as stating
that an upside of ten times its investment in a potential client was "borderline" in terms of
deciding whether to accept the client).
88 See id. at 67 (reporting that Cooley Godward received issuer equity almost every time
the firm requested it when representing venture capital clients).
89
See id. at 69 (noting that among big Silicon Valley firms, big public companies are not
desired clients).
90 See Lashinsky, supra note 73, at 134 ("The true path to riches was equity, particularly
stock options in just-formed technology companies.").
91 Sweet Valley High, LAWYER, Jan. 29, 2001,2001 WL 11471306 (noting that VLG only
represents start-up companies because that work is "more fun" and "more lucrative").
92
But see Howard, supra note 68 (quoting the CEO of Epinions.com as having "an
allergic reaction" when VLG demanded equity as part of its compensation for legal services,
but acquiescing due to VLG's success in representing technology start-ups).
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signals to the client that the attorney is a team player.93 In addition, cash-poor
start-up companies looking for venture capital are happy to pay in equity, which
is "free" to them now or, alternatively, happy to give equity to corporate counsel
in exchange for a much-needed infusion of cash. 94 Finally, these liaisons have
retained all of the risk and all of the control of the company; in ceding control to
an outside attorney, they are also spreading some of that risk.95

B. A Fee by Any OtherName
Although the practice of attorneys taking or purchasing equity in clients is not
entirely new, 96 the frequency of this practice and the windfall results that have
occurred are definitely novel. Historically, law firm policies on the practice of
investing in clients have been varied, with many firms having strict disclosure
procedures or prohibiting the practice entirely and some firms letting individuals
invest on a case-by-case basis. 97
Law firms negotiate for this equity in different ways. One way is to receive
equity in lieu of legal fees in exchange for legal services. 98 Another mechanism is
for the law firm to charge ordinary hourly fees, but receive equity in addition to
that fee. 99 Thirdly, in addition to hourly fees, the attorney can require that the

93 See Manning, supra note 72 (quoting Jeff Harmes of Portland's Tonkon Torp law firm
as saying: "[Iqt's almost to the point that if your lawyer isn't willing to put a little skin in the
game, maybe you have the wrong lawyer.").
94
See id. (noting that clients have begun to view equity investments by outside attorneys
as a key piece of "seed financing").
95 See Ravdin & Capps, supra note 44, at 391 (stating that straight hourly billing creates a
situation in which the client retains all the risk, but the attorney has all the control).
96
See Renee Deger, Taking Stock. Hittingthe Jackpot,RECORDER (San Francisco), Jan. 6,
2000, Silicon Scene, at I (noting that Wilson Sonsini has been investing in clients since the
1960s); Manning, supra, note 72 (stating that Perkins Coie has been taking equity in clients
since the mid- 1980s).
97 See Lashinsky, supra note 73, at 134 (noting that although Cooley Godward had always
allowed partners to invest in a separate fund voluntarily, before the boom the sporadic
disbursements were very modest, usually in the $5000 range).
I was an associate at two large law firms that had detailed investment policies that applied
to all attorney investments, not just investments in clients. One law firm allowed investments in
any company, but prohibited owning any stock options or placing "puts" or "calls" on any
security. The other law firm had an investment policy that also applied to all attorney
investments. The policy was so restrictive, requiring permission from a firm committee before
buying or selling any stock, that most associates and partners either held investments only in
mutual funds or put all investments in a blind trust.
98 See infra Part III.B.I.
99 See Howard, supra note 68 (reporting that many firms charge the ordinary premium
rate in addition to demanding equity shares).
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client allow the law firm or individual lawyers to purchase equity in the client
during the formation stage. 100
1. Equity in Lieu of Fees
Obviously, the riskiest practice is for the law firm to receive all or a portion of
its legal fee in company stock.' 0' Accordingly, more conservative firms that
engage in this practice restrict the percentage of the fee they will accept in the
form of stock.' 0 2 Because the majority of this stock will be given before the
company goes public, the value of the stock is an unknown variable. If the
company, helped by the law firm, successfully completes an initial public
offering, then the value of the stock could skyrocket and literally be worth
millions. Legal representation that would have garnered a legal fee in the
10 3
hundreds of thousands could easily yield ten times that amount or more.
However, equity in lieu of fees is closely akin to a contingent fee. The equity
fee may actually be contingent on the completion of a transaction, or it may
realistically be so.10 4 For example, if a company is unconditionally paying a law
firm in stock for preparation of an IPO, and the IPO does not materialize, then the
stock may be virtually worthless to the law firm. 10 5 Of course the company, and
the stock that reflects ownership of that company, will have some value, but that
100 See Susan Orenstein, Lawyers
Need Equity, Too, INDUSTRY STANDARD,

Apr. 10,

2000, http://www.thestandard.com/article/0,1902,13463,00.html (stating that for VLG, client
equity was not "barter" for legal services because VLG invested its own money in clients, up to
$250,000); see also Blackwood, supra note 69 (noting that between 1996 and 2000, Cooley
Godward paid cash for founder's stock, warrants or options from one hundred clients and that
when that stock is sold, it is treated as firm income and distributed according to the partnership
agreement).
101 See Blackwood, supra note 69 (reporting that Brobeck, Phleger stopped accepting
equity in lieu of fees in 1998 because of the potential for cash flow problems). But see
Manning, supra note 72 (citing Stoel Rives as refusing to defer legal fees but choosing instead
to accept stock in lieu of those fees).
102 See Cameron Stracher, Beyond Billable Hours, WALL ST. J., Feb. 12, 2001, at A26
(stating that New York's LeBoeuf, Lamb, Green & MacRae would accept only 30% of its fee
in stock, and Shearman & Sterling, 50%).
103 See Lashinsky, supra note 73, at 136 (compaing Cooley Godward's usual legal fees
of $250,000 collected in connection with an IPO to the additional $5 to $10 million it also
receives in stock). However, this comparison may be misleading in situations in which the law
firm represents the company from inception and bills the company an amount approaching or
exceeding $1 million or more over the life of the representation.
104 See Ass'n of the Bar of the City of N.Y. Comm. on Prof I & Judicial Ethics, Formal
Op. 2000-3 (2000), available at http://www.abcny.org/eth2000.htm#20003 [hereinafter
ABCNY Op.] (last visited May 19, 2003) (noting that some jurisdictions have concluded that
securities given to an attomey pursuant to a public offering are in essence a contingent fee).
105 See Manning, supra note 72 ("[T]he firms could wind up losing their entire stake in
the young companies if they go nowhere.").
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value is discounted if no ready market exists to purchase those shares. 10 6 In
addition, many of the fledgling companies paying their attorneys in stock in the
1990s were technology companies with few capital assets, making valuation of
non-public stock even less certain.
2. Equity in Addition to Fees
One variation of receiving stock in lieu of fees is for attorneys to receive a
customary legal fee, usually calculated in the traditional manner as billable hours
10 7
multiplied by an hourly rate, and equity shares in addition to that hourly fee.
The receipt of the equity shares may be conditioned on certain performance
milestones or on the completion of a transaction, but the shares may simply be
another component of the total fee. The receipt of equity in this circumstance may
induce the law firm to defer billing of traditional legal fees until financing is
10 8
obtained.
3. Investment Opportunitiesin Addition to Fees
A third variation that grew in popularity during the technology boom is to
require the client to allow the law firm to buy equity in the client. 10 9 A law firm
has to actually make a payment to the client for the value of the stock, but this
stock is bought very cheaply. 1' 0 Even if the law firm pays the same price as other
early investors, the stock will be cheap compared to what the same stock would
be at the time of a subsequent IPO.I11
106

See Goodman, supra note 78 (giving the opinion of Eliot Abbot, partner at Miami's

Klugler, Peretz, Kaplan & Berlen, that a law firm should ensure that the company has more
than one exit strategy, not just an IPO plan, to guarantee that the law firm will be able to cash
out).
107 See Kevin Miller, Lawyers as Venture Capitalists: An Economic Analysis of Law
Firms That Invest in Their Clients, 13 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 435, 437 (2000) (describing equity
as the premium for law firms' loaning legal services to start-up clients).
108 See Manning, supra note 72 (stating that Portland's Ater Wynne law firm prefers not
to invest its own cash in its clients, but to receive founder's stock in return for deferring
payment of its fees, which are collected once financing is obtained).
109 See Goodman, supra note 78 (reporting that VLG defers fees until financing is
obtained in return for the opportunity to invest in the client).
10 See id.
(describing company stock as cheap at the idea stage, the pre-IPO stage).
111 See Baker, supra note 7, at 38. However, recipients of "cheap" stock will point out that
the price paid is the fair market value of the stock, which reflects the risk inherent in non-public
stock. Another flag is raised if the attorney is an active participant in setting the price of the
stock. See Antonella T. Popoff, Lawyers Taking Equity Interests in Internet Companies Must
Be Alert to Special Ethical Risks, N.Y. ST. BAR J., Oct. 2002, at 19, 21 (2002) (listing
"investing in a private placement and participating in the price negotiations between the client
and independent, third-party investors" as one of several "Questionable Practices").
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Law firms have chosen to make these investments in several ways. Some law
firms have created separate funds in which stock is held in the name of the
firm." 12 Investments are held in common, and law firm partnership agreements or
investment agreements prescribe how gains will be distributed.1 13 At Venture
Law Group, the partnership agreement requires the partners to make minimum
investments in opportunities given to them by clients. 114 The gains from these
investments are shared in differing proportions among all employees, attorneys,
and staff. 1 5 Some law firms with investment funds also allow individual
attorneys to hold investments in clients." 6 For firms without investment funds, all
investments are held individually.1 17 One reason cited for having a separate
investment fund is to maintain sufficient diversification so that no one stake is
significant in the economics of the firm.1 1 8 In addition, some law firms report that
having defined investment policies prevents misunderstandings later from
attorneys who feel excluded from profits."1 9 Amazingly, the investment funds at
some law firms have grown so large as to raise Investment Company Act
20
issues.1

112 The Cooley Godward twenty-year-old investment fund operates by partners making
voluntary contributions to the fund, with the proceeds being distributed to those contributors in
proportion to the individual investment amounts. Associates who have been at the firm for five
years may also invest, but by contributing a promissory note instead of cash. This note is due
and payable when the associate makes partner. The firm also maintains a bonus plan for
associates and staff that is payable from the proceeds of the fund. In contrast, Brobeck, Phleger
instituted a similar fund in 1998 that is funded with partnership profits. Gains are distributed to
partners, associates, and staff. Blackwood, supra note 69.
113 See id. (describing how investment vehicles may cause internal disruption in law firms
among attomeys).
114 See Miller, supra note 107, at 440 (reporting that the VLG partnership agreement
requires partners to take 10% to 20% of the equity opporlunity).
115 See Deger, supra note 96 (noting that some funds have vesting schedules that entice
associates to remain at the firm).
116
See Howard, supra note 68 (reporting that VLG allows an individual lawyer who
brings in a new client to invest the lawyer's own funds in that client).
117 See id. (stating that law firms without investment funds allow attomeys to invest
individually, but in modest amounts).
118 See id. ("Most firms keep a vast portfolio and take equity in small enough amounts
that the investment wouldn't seem likely to cloud their judgment.").
119 See Deger, supra note 96 (stating that some associates grumble over how windfall
equity profits are distributed); see also Janet L. Conley, Applying RICO, Lawyer Sues Ex-Firm
for Fiaud, RECORDER (San Francisco), Mar. 16, 2001, at 3 (reporting that an associate, whose
offer letter promised him the opportunity to benefit from an investment fund that was in the
process of being established but who was fired before the fund was created, attempted to sue the
firm, Red Hot Law Group, under the RICO statute for his lost opportunity costs).
120 See Tanya Patterson, Heightened Securities Liabilityfor Lawyers Who Invest in Their
Clients: Worth the Risk?, 80 TEX. L. REV. 639, 646 (2002); Investment Company Act Release
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Regardless of which form the equity takes or when it is paid, the equity is part
of the fee. Although some attorneys prefer to say that none of the equity received
is in lieu of a fee, 12 1 if the receipt of equity or opportunity to invest is negotiated
as a condition to accepting the representation, then the equity is part of the fee.
The client would not consider giving the attorney stock or the opportunity to buy
stock unless the attorney was also going to provide services for the client. In
addition, if the giving or selling of equity were barred by law or circumstances,
the attorney would in all likelihood charge a higher monetary fee. Also, all equity
shares given to the attorney before a market is created for that equity are
analogous to a contingent fee. Therefore, no matter what form the transfer of
equity takes, if a law firm purchases or accepts stock in a start-up company in the
course of representing that client in an IPO, the result is equity in lieu of a fee that
for all practical purposes is contingent on the closing of a certain transaction,
generally a public offering.
C. Who Needs the Lottery? Law Firms Hit the Big One
In the litigation context, onlookers gape at the amount of attorneys' fees
awarded in personal injury cases, such as the state by state tobacco litigation that
earned many winning attorneys millions of dollars. 1 22 Although large personal
injury awards and attorneys' fees are highly publicized, these fees are generally
outliers, with only a few attorneys receiving them in only a few cases during their
careers. 123 In fact, most personal injury lawyers survive economically by having a
portfolio of cases: 124 some of the cases go to trial and are lost; some cases are
settled for small, medium, or large amounts; and some cases go to trial and result
in small, medium, or large judgments. This diversification of risk causes a
personal injury plaintiffs lawyer to be seen as playing the lottery each time he
accepts a client's case. However, at least for awhile, many Silicon Valley law
firms were hitting the lottery every time they played.

No. 25,146, 66 Fed. Reg. 46,660 (Aug. 29, 2001) (application for exemption from the
Investment Company Act by WS Investment Co., LLP, Wilson Sonsini's investment fund).
121 See Miller, supra note 107, at 440 (remarking that although firms say that they are not
taking equity as fees, the promise of equity induces firms to delay billing and the returns on the
equity are a large part of partner profits).
122

See MICHAEL OREY,

ASSUMING THE RISK: THE MAVERICKS, THE LAWYERS, AND THE

WHISTLE-BLOWERS WHO BEAT BIG TOBACCO 360-61 (1999) (retelling how in the Mississippi
tobacco cases, a panel of arbitrators awarded the winning attorneys $1.43 billion, with the lead
attorney receiving ten percent of that award, or $143 million).
123 See Herbert M. Kritzer, Contingency Fee Lawyers as Gatekeepers in the Civil Justice
System, 81 JUDICATURE 22,22 (1997).
124 See id. at 23 (describing contingent fee lawyers as portfolio managers, evaluating the
risk of each case in relation to the potential return).
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The profits made by Silicon Valley law fimis seem staggering when viewed
both individually and in the aggregate. One often-cited example is Wilson
Sonsini's representation of VA Linux in its initial public offering in December
1999. VA Linux stock was valued at $30 per share at the opening of the market,
but closed that day at over $239 per share.1 2 5 In one day of trading, the value of
Wilson Sonsini's 102,584 shares rocketed to $24.5 million.' 26 However, VA
Linux was not the only winning card Wilson Sonsini held that year. The Palo
Alto law firm also took Webvan public, and at the end of the first day of trading,
the firm's shares in its client were worth more than $51 million.' 27 According to
public securities filings, and not including any shares that may have been sold,
shares held by Wilson Sonsini partners at the end of 1999 from clients they took
public that year totaled $230 million.' 28 Moreover, the year 2000 did not have
doomsday consequences for Wilson Sonsini; in February 2000, the firm took
29
Avanex Corp. public. One month later, its shares were worth $109 million.'
VLG was not far behind. With fewer partners to divide among than Wilson
Sonsini, its total holdings in IPO client equity at the close of 1999 totaled $62
million.130 VLG took stock in all seventeen IPO clients it represented in 1999. 31I
In each of six of those companies, VLG's take-home after one day of trading was
over $1 million.' 32 In 2000, VLG represented twenty-five new companies in
33

POs. 1

In 1999, law firms in Silicon Valley midwifed 173 clients in IPOs and owned
equity in ninety-nine of those clients. 134 The practice of acquiring equity in clients
was not limited to a handful of Silicon Valley firms, however. According to the
American Bar Association, one-third of IPOs in 1999 involved attorneys who
held pre-lPO stock in the issuer.' 35 More interestingly, established law firms who
historically had banned the practice of investing in clients embraced this new
136
profit machine.
Baker, supra note 7, at 36.
126 Id.
127 Id. at 39.
128 Beck, supranote 81, at 66.
125

1291Id.
130 Id.

131 Baker, supra note 7, at 41. But see Deger, supra note 96 (reporting the number as

sixteen out of eighteen IPO clients).
132 Baker, supra note 7, at 41.
133 Lashinsky, supra note 73, at 134.
134 Deger, supra note 96.
135 See Howard, supranote 68.
136 Benjamin Mark Cole, More L.A. Lawyers Accept Client Equity in Lieu of Fee, L.A.

Bus. J., Dec. 6, 1999, at 55 (citing Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher and O'Melveny & Myers as new
converts).
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Admittedly, the euphoria of IPO day sometimes wears off, and law firms
may have to watch the stock price drop while being prevented from selling their
shares. Depending on when the law firms acquired the equity, they are usually
required to hold the shares for 180 days after the offering 137 and may be
prevented from trading the shares for one or two years from receipt of the
shares. 138 However, many IPOs can maintain high stock prices for six months or
longer. 139 For example, Wilson Sonsini represented Commerce One in its July
1999 IPO, in which its offer price of $21 nearly doubled. 140 Six months later, the
shares were worth over ten times the offer price. 14 1 VLG took Foundry Networks
public in September 1999, and in seven months VLG's shares continued to
increase in value from $8.4 million to $16 million. 142 Some companies, and a law
firm only needs some of such clients, continue to grow following an IPO. Cisco, a
client of Brobeck, Phleger, enjoyed a 15,191% return on its share price from its
1990 IPO to 2000.143 In addition, because much of the stock the law firm receives
is free or extremely discounted, a wise law firm, which handles144its investments in
a way to minimize exposure, can maintain a winning portfolio.

V. Now, WHA TDo You Do AGAIN?
THE ROLE OF TRANSACTIONAL LAWYERS
The next portion of this article will analyze the potential conflicts of interest
created by holding equity in a client in the context of the corporate attorney's
roles as a transactional engineer, a reputational intermediary, and a gatekeeper. To
do so, these roles must first be described. The next section will then analyze how
137 See Howard, supra note 68 (citing the 180 day lock-up period as a restriction on the
motivation of an attorney-investor not to scrutinize a prospectus just to bolster the offering price
of a new security).
138 See D.M. Osborne, Start-up Fever,AM. LAW. July/Aug. 1996, at 73, 76 (pointing out
that most shares that law firms receive are "restricted securities" and cannot be sold for up to
two years from receipt of those shares).
139 See also Deger, supra note 96 (describing Wilson Sonsini's portfolio as increasing
from $143 million as of opening day to $230 million as of December 31, 1999).
140 Baker, supra note 7, at 43.
141 Id.
142 Orenstein, supra note 100, at 148.
143 See Stracher, supra note 102 (noting that Brobeck, Phleger received a "lucrative equity
share" for taking Cisco public).
144 See Howard, supra note 68 (noting that most lawyers pay the deeply discounted rate
the venture capitalists pay, if the firms pay for the stock at all). Of course, the issue of
investments begs the question whether lawyers or law firms are qualified to handle huge
portfolios for themselves or their firms. See Beck, supra note 81, at 69 (reporting Mark Tanoury
of Cooley Godward as admitting that he imprudently sold stock in Qualcomm, Inc.,
Broadvision, Inc., and Metricom, Inc. shortly before each stock increased in value over
1000%).
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the conflicts that arise in each of these roles may subject a corporate attorney to
liability under ethical rules, professional malpractice law, and securities fraud.
Most Americans could describe to you what a trial lawyer does based on
watching an hour or two of television a day.14 5 Many litigators in a large fir-m,
however, could not tell you what their counterparts on the "Corporate" or
"Business" or "Finance" floors do to fill their hours. Even without an Ally
McBeal to rally behind, transactional attorneys have very quietly been the
lucrative backbone of the largest firms in the United States. These are the
attorneys who draft the contracts that may eventually get litigated by the
commercial litigators; the attorneys who negotiate the mergers and acquisitions
that the trial lawyers did not succeed in trying to stop; the attorneys who prepare
the documentation for the securities offerings that may someday be scrutinized by
plaintiffs lawyers looking to file a shareholder derivative suit; and the attorneys
structuring complicated financing vehicles that will hopefully withstand future
scrutiny by investors and regulators.
If popular culture has largely ignored the corporate attorney, 146 so have the
agencies that regulate attorney conduct. In the United States, the American Bar
Association promulgated the Model Code of Professional Responsibility in 1969
and the Model Rules of Professional Conduct in 1983,147 but leaves adoption and
enforcement of these rules to state agencies supervised by state supreme
courts. 14 8 These rules have historically focused on the stereotypical representation
of an individual client by an individual attorney in an adversarial proceeding.1 49
Although a section purporting to address the representation of organizational
clients was included in the Model Rules, the typical transactional representation

145 See generally Law & Order: General Info, TNT, at http://www.tnt.tv/ritle/View4/
0,5878,33380815251602111-,00.html (last visited May 19, 2003) (listing Law & Order, the
country's longest-running legal police drama, as appearing on its network at least three times a
day each weekday).
146 See JAY MCINERNY, BRIGHTNESS FALLs 11 (1992) (describing a guest at a dinner
party among stock brokers, literary types, a Hollywood producer, and a model as a "corporate
lawyer" who "thankfully never talked about it").
147 Richard L. Abel, Why Does the ABA PromulgateEthicalRules?, 59 TEX. L. REV. 639,
639-41 (1981) (detailing the history of the ABA ethical rules in anticipation of the Proposed
Final Draft of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct).
148 See id. at 640 (criticizing the fact that the time and attention given to legal ethics at the
ABA level is duplicated in each state). Therefore, each state bar association adopts disciplinary
rules based either on the Model Rules or their predecessor, the Model Code, and enforces them
through disciplinary proceedings. See id.
149 Peter C. Kostant, Eit, Voice and Loyalty in the Course of CorporateGovernance and

Counsel's Changing Role, 28 J. SocIO-ECON. 203, 213 (1999) (asserting that the Model Code

provided as a model client a living individual and that the Model Rules did little to change this
paradigm).
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of a large corporate client by attorneys who are part of a large law firm is not
50
realistically reflected in that section. 1
A. Who Is the Client?
Atticus Finch always knew who his client was. 151 His client was the
individual sitting next to him in court. Atticus was representing his client against
the prosecutor, an individual representing the state government; Atticus never
represented the prosecutor or the state government. If Atticus needed to know
what his client wanted to do in a situation or what his client's long-term
does not
objectives were, all he had to do was turn and ask him. This scenario
1 52
a
client.
as
entity
business
a
has
who
attorney
apply to the transactional
In a typical securities offering, financing, or other corporate transaction, the
153
attorney's client is defined by the Model Rules as the corporate entity.
However, the voice on the other end of the telephone asking the attorney to begin
work on a particular project is not the voice of "the entity."'1 54 Unfortunately, a
corporate attorney is unable to turn to one specific individual and receive
instructions from the corporate entity, although the Model Rules seem to
anticipate that many persons may make decisions for the corporation. 155 Unless
these decisions violate the law, the Model Rules direct the attorney to accept the
decisions as the will of the corporation, even if "their utility or prudence is
56
doubtful."

150 See id.(revealing how Rule 1.13 describes the client as an entity, but then directs an
attorney's loyalties to management).

151 See HARPER LEE, To KILL A MOCKINGBIRD (1960) (presenting the character of
attorney and single father Atticus Finch, who must face the fierce prejudices of his community
when he zealously represents an African-American man falsely accused of rape).
152 For purposes of this article, I am using a corporation as an example of a business
client, although the same ethical dilemmas arise during the representation of a partnership,
limited liability company, joint venture, or other organization.
153 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13(a) (1983) ("A lawyer employed or
retained by an organization represents the organization acting through its duly authorized
constituents.").

154 See KLEIN & COFFEE, supra note 42, at 110-11 (describing law's reification of the
corporation as "abstract and potentially misleading" in attempting to describe in simple terms
something as complex as a corporation); see also MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13
cmt. I (recognizing that an organizational client can only act through its officers, directors,
employees, shareholders, and other constituents).
155 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13 cmt. I (naming as constituencies of the
organization the officers, directors, employees, and shareholders); see also Kostant, supra note
4, at 213 (criticizing the Model Rules for creating a presumption that inside managers act in the
best interest of the corporation).
156 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13(a) (1983).
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A corporate entity may be seen as an agency mechanism among the
shareholders as principals and the managers as agents. 157 Alternatively, other
theorists have built on the agency model and viewed a corporation as a nexus of
contracts between the constituencies of shareholders, officers, and directors.1 5 8
Most recently, corporate theory has begun to describe a corporation as a team of
various constituencies, whereby the shareholders have ceded control to an
independent board of directors. 1 59 Under any theory, the agendas of officers,
directors, and shareholders are very different. Officers, who are usually
employees of the company, usually strive to maintain their own positions and the
viability of their own projects.160 Different shareholders have different objectives,
with some shareholders willing to sacrifice long-term stability for short-term gain
and others preferring to forego present risk to assure the company's continued
growth. 161 Directors have historically been seen as the most closely aligned with
the perceived objectives of "the entity," striving to make decisions that are in the
long-term best interests of the continued viability of the company.16 2
In both the agency theory and the closely related contractarian theory, the
directors and officers owe fiduciary duties to the shareholders, who own the
entity.163 However, under recent economic theor and jurisprudence, the directors
157 See Adolph A. Berle Jr., Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARv. L. REV.
1049, 1049 (1931) (describing the separation of ownership and control in a corporation and
analogizing a corporation as a trust for the benefit of the shareholders, with management as the
trustees with fiduciary duties to those shareholders). But see E. Merrick Dodd, For Whom Are
Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REv. 1145, 1146 (1932) (stating that the
corporate entity is a reality, not a legal fiction, and that the managers of the corporation have
fiduciary duties toward the entity, not toward the individual stockholders).
158 See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976); KLEIN &
COFFEE, supra note 42, at 173-74 (describing the "neo..classical" theory that the market will
cause corporate constituencies to contract with one another so as to minimize any agency costs).
159
See Kostant, supra note 149, at 222-28 (describing the Team Production Model).
160 See KLEIN & COFFEE, supra note 42, at 174-75 (describing the "managerialist" view
that managers will sacrifice profit maximization to increase the size of the corporation, thus
enlarging their empire and their salaries and thwarting takeover attempts).
161 But see Henry Hansmann, Ownership of the Firm, 4 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 267, 283
(1988) (suggesting that differences in risk preferences among shareholders can be eliminated to
the extent that shareholders select which firms to own).
162 See Kostant, supra note 149, at 225 (hypothesizing that legislatures have accepted the
theory that the board of directors is more independent and opportunistic than inside managers,
and that this difference is why some state statutes allow directors, but not managers, to be
indemnified for certain acts). But see KLEIN & COFFEE, supra note 42, at 128-29 (recognizing
that although directors are not agents of the shareholders but of the entity, the business of the
entity is primarily to maximize the retum to shareholders; however, directors have "great
discretion" as to the method of profit maximization).
163 See Oliver E. Williamson, Corporate Governance, 93 YALE L.J. 1197, 1210 (1984)
(stating that the purpose of the board of directors should be viewed as protecting the investment
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and officers owe fiduciary duties only to the entity itself and consider other
constituencies besides shareholders in making decisions. 16 4 This model argues
against the law and economics theory that officers and directors have a duty only
to maximize shareholder wealth.' 65 Regardless, passive shareholders are
commonly believed not to have fiduciary duties to the entity or any other
66
constituency.1
Because the various constituencies have differing short-term and long-term
objectives, identifying the objectives and best interests of the entity can be
difficult for outside counsel. Unfortunately, the Model Rules give little guidance
in this regard. Most likely, the person engaging the attorney is an in-house
attorney at the corporation. 167 If the corporation is smaller or the attorney has a
relationship with the company, the primary contact may be a manager of the
company, who may also be an officer of that company. 168 The other
constituencies of the corporation, the shareholders and the directors, will most
likely not be a part of the conversation. During the course of the representation,
the attorney will work closely with senior management of the company and any
in-house legal counsel. At the end of the month, or the end of the project, the
attorney will send a bill to the corporation, probably to the general counsel, if any,
or one of the senior managers, who will then submit the bill to be paid. If the
work is satisfactory to the managers of the company, then the attorney may be
69
sent more legal work in the future. 1

of shareholders, "who face a diffuse but significant risk of expropriation because the assets in
question are numerous and ill-defined, and cannot be protected in a well-focused, transactionspecific way"); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, CorporateControl Transactions,91
YALE L.J. 698, 700 (1982).
164
See Roberta S. Karmel, Implications of the Stakeholder Model, 61 GEo. WASH. L.
REv. 1156, 1162--63 (1993) (describing how over half the states have passed statutes allowing
directors to consider short-term and long-term interests of the corporation and take into
consideration groups such as employees, suppliers, customers, and creditors, not just
shareholders).
165 See Kostant, supra note 149, at 227 (asserting that directors are empowered under
some state statutes to prevent self-interested shareholders from receiving short-term profits by
killing the "corporate golden goose").
166 But see KLEIN & COFFEE, supranote 42, at 170 (noting that generally only officers and
directors have fiduciary duties to the corporation, but that in cases where a shareholder is a
controlling shareholder, that shareholder may have a fiduciary responsibility to the minority
shareholders and the corporation).
167 See Daly, supra note 30, at 1061-62 (describing as one function of a general counsel
to manage and review work of outside counsel).
168 See Kostant, supra note 149, at 213 (noting that traditionally, corporate attomeys gave
allegiance to senior managers who controlled the representation).
169 See id. at 231 (noting the practical reality that although lawyers have legal duties only
to the corporate entity, "corporate lawyers have traditionally been the loyal servants of
management").
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In an ideal world, outside counsel would communicate with senior managers
or in-house counsel, who would instruct the attorney as to the objectives of the
company without revealing any opportunistic goals of the liaison, however slight.
The attorney would perform the representation with only those goals in mind,
ignorant of the individual agenda of the liaison. Other members of management
would work with the attorney to provide sufficient information, whether or not
that information impacted on any individual goals of that individual. In reality,
however, the outside counsel becomes friends with or becomes professionally
dependent on that liaison, and that liaison often has an individual agenda.' 70 For
example, the business manager who secures the representation for a certain
transaction may let the attorney know that the transaction should be closed by a
certain date in order for the liaison to receive a large bonus in a certain fiscal year.
Or, members of management charged with supplying information to the attorney
may have substantial stock options that will be very valuable following the
closing of a securities offering. 171
The realities of representation are often murky. Outside counsel are often
caught between the politics of business managers and the legal department;
between the long-term objectives of the board of directors and the short-term
objectives of management; and between the fir-reaching legal position of the
17 2
entity and the pressing financial and career positions of the liaisons.
B. The Value of a TransactionalAttorney
The role of a transactional attorney is very elastic, and the most successful
attorneys tend to stretch their capabilities to suit their clients. For example, if.a
corporate client wishes to finance the building of a capital asset, such as a
petroleum refinery, an attorney may have various roles in that transaction. Two
straightforward and traditional roles will be to draft the agreements and to
negotiate the terms of those agreements once the client has decided who will
provide the financing. As part of that role, the attorney may be part of early
discussions in which decisions are made as to the nature of the financing; the
17

0 See Litan & Salop, supra note 21, at 193 (divulging that inside attorneys may ask
outside counsel to engage in certain practices to preserve their own status or to maximize their
own budgets).
171 Cf Ronald J.Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Foreword:Business Lawyers and Value
Creationfor Clients, 74 OR. L. REV. 1, 12 (1995) (describing a merger scenario in which both

the manager of a target company and its outside counsel, who both may lose their livelihoods
following the merger, may have individual goals inconsistent with the best interests of the
company).
172 See Kostant, supra note 149, at 233 (comparing the difficulties of representing an
individual and representing a corporation and concluding that "the corporate attorney has the
profoundly more difficult problem of representing an entity comprised of potentially warring
constituencies of unequal power and influence, none of whom isher client").
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attorney may help the client determine whether the client should borrow from a
commercial lender, issue debentures or securities, or do a mixture of both. The
attorney may also help the client decide whether to finance the project at the
parent level or at a subsidiary level and whether to approach a potential joint
venturer about the project. Depending on the business acumen and inclination of
the attorney, and the relationship the attorney has with the client, the attorney may
have also counseled the client about which commercial banks or underwriters to
approach concerning financing. Many times, a seasoned attorney can instruct a
client on what is customary or "market" for certain transactions: what pricing and
restrictions a client can expect a lender or investor to require. During the
negotiations, the attorney will counsel the client on what materials to make
available to the other party and on what representations and warranties to provide
based on those materials. Depending on the structure of the financing, the
attorney may have to prepare an offering memorandum or a prospectus with
certain disclosures and financial information. At the closing of the transaction, the
attorney will usually be asked to provide a legal opinion, in writing, that the
transaction satisfies the parties' desires for a specific result and that specific
documents effectuate that result and are enforceable.
In these roles, the corporate attomey acts as a counselor, a wordsmith, and a
negotiator, 173 but also a transaction cost engineer, 174 a reputational
intermediary 175 and a gatekeeper. 176 As a transaction cost engineer, attorneys
work to add value to transactions by eliminating two obstacles to maximizing
gain: transaction costs and lack of informational symmetry. 17 7 In this role, the
attorney tries to minimize the transaction costs by maneuvering clients through
regulatory schemes, facilitating the creation and provision of information, and
creating structures in the operative documents that give comfort to the parties,
who are aware that they are operating under imperfect knowledge about past,
173

See Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset

Pricing, 94 YALE L.J. 239, 242 (1984) (listing the roles that a business lawyer plays as
"counselor, planner, drafter, negotiator, investigator, lobbyist, scapegoat, champion, and...

friend").
174 See id. at 254-55 (hypothesizing that a business lawyer's role is to reduce transaction
costs, therefore reducing the invalidity of two of the assumptions underlying the capital asset
pricing theory: (1) there are no transaction costs and (2) all information is freely available).
175 See id. at 288-93 (describing how parties overcome any final discomfort regarding
asymmetry of information by having the disclosures and representations of one party verified

by a third-party: the representing party's prestigious attorney); Karl S. Okamoto, Reputation
and the Value of Lawyers, 74 OR. L. REv. 15, 18 (1995) (proposing that one reason for the
ongoing success of law firms in the face of competition from in-house legal departments is that
only outside law firms can serve as a reputational intermediaries for clients).
176
See Lisa Bernstein, The Silicon Valley Lawyer as a Transaction Cost Engineer?, 74
OR. L.. REV. 239, 240 (1995) (describing an attorney's various roles as including dealmaking,
matchmaking, proselytizing, gatekeeping, and conciliating).
177 See Gilson, supranote 173, at 255.
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current and future events. As a reputational intermediary, an attorney effectively
"rents" the reputation of her law firm and vouches for the integrity of her client
and for the integrity of information provided by that client, usually in a written
legal opinion.1 78 Although the client may be unknown to the other party, the law
firm is a repeat player whose long-term professional success depends on its ability
to continue renting its reputation as a third-party intermediary.1 79 An attorney's
gatekeeping function is closely aligned to its reputational intermediary function.
By refusing to represent clients that the attorney will not vouch for and by
requiring certain actions of a client before continuing a representation or issuing a
legal opinion, 180 a corporate attorney can asste other parties that the client
appearing at the closing table is trustworthy.
Moreover, all three of these important functions require that the attorney be
independent from the client.
1. Transaction Cost Engineer
At first glance, an attorney's independence may not seem so critical when the
attorney is in the role of transaction cost engineer. A client and its attorney should
have the same goals and objectives toward minimizing transaction costs and
negotiating solutions designed to move transactions forward. As long as the
attorney has no conflict of interest with other parties in the transaction and is not
increasing the transaction costs with unnecessary legal work, the parties' desires
seem well-aligned. In this scenario, an attorney might not be concerned with
giving the appearance of being captured by the client. In fact, in-house counsel,
who are by definition captured, often function as transaction cost engineers for
18 1
corporations.
However, the transaction cost engineer function is closely related to the
reputational intermediary function of the corporate attorney. A large part of how
well an attorney functions as a minimizer of transactional costs depends on the
value of that attorney's reputation with other parties. When other parties obtain a
higher comfort level with the motivations of a client based on the reputation of the
client's counsel, then parties tend to move the transaction along and not get mired
178
179

See id. at 290.
See Okamoto, supra note 175, at 22-23 (noting that for many clients, the subject

transaction is very important economically, and so the temptation for clients to "cheat" is very
large; therefore, only an outside law firm for whom this representation is just one of many can
be relied on to make the necessary reputation capital investment).
180 See Bernstein, supra note 176, at 248 (theorizing that lawyers screen out would-be
clients who are not willing to abide by business community norms); Wilkins, supra note 16, at
1164 (describing the gatekeeping function of preventing potential violations of clients).
181 See Daly, supra note 30, at 1061 (asserting that in-house attorneys are called upon to
facilitate complex transactions, adding value by being intimately knowledgeable in the business
goals of the client and by being immediately available).
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down in details. Therefore, if an attorney's interdependence with the client creates
a conflict of interest, then the attorney's value as a transactional cost engineer may
be reduced.
2. ReputationalIntermediary
One of the clearest value-adding functions of the corporate attorney is to act
as a reputational intermediary for the client. If individuals are known for the
company they keep, then clients are certainly known for the attorneys that they
82
hire.1
Many times in a transaction, one party will be called on to rely on another
party's representation that something is true or that something will or will not
happen. If one party cannot give assurance through a contractual term or
reference to controlling law, the other party will have difficulty in "getting
comfortable" with an unknown. 183 A reputational intermediary who is an
independent third party such as an accountant or an attorney gets parties over this
hurdle. 184 The party's own attorney will advise that he or she "is comfortable"
when a certain law firm is giving the assurance. This attorney knows the
reputational law firm, knows the law firm has its future livelihood and prestige at
stake, and feels assured that the law firm would not risk its name
185
unnecessarily.
In addition, in a transaction in which one party may be a one-time player,
such as the seller of a business, that party may have incentives to "cheat," or not
disclose certain information. 186 The attorney, on the other hand, will remain in the
corporate world after the seller has exited, so the attorney has a stake in making
sure that the seller discloses that information. 187 The attorney can counsel the
seller to make the disclosure, but she can also remind the seller that the attorney
182 See Gilson, supra note 173, at 291 (noting that parties often ask who the attorneys are
on the other side, if the party on the other side is unfamiliar); see also ROBERT W. HAMILTON &
RICHARD BooTH, CORPORATION FINANCE 882 (3d ed. 2001) (stating that a buyer may refuse to

accept a legal opinion from an unknown law firm, and that the more prestigious the law firm,

the more weight that law firm's opinion will be given).
183 See Gilson, supra note 173, at 288-89 (describing "final-period problems" in which
parties cannot guarantee that the possibility of misleading statements has been eliminated).
184 See id. at 290-91 (giving accountants and attorneys as examples of third-party
reputational intermediaries).
185 See id. at 291 (explaining that reputational business lawyers will not risk that
reputation for one client).
186

See id. at 288 (describing opportunism of senior management that the verification
techniques of the other party may be unable to detect).
187 See id. at 289 (theorizing that a reputational intermediary will not "cheat" because he
expects future transactions in which he will need to pledge his reputation); Okamoto, supra note
175, at 45 (noting that repeat players are able to lend their reputations to one-time participants).
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will be expected to deliver a legal opinion that will be worded unsatisfactorily if
the seller does not comply. In an extreme circumstance, the attorney may feel that
withdrawal from the representation is necessary. If the attorney does not persuade
the client to disclose or then withdraw, the attorney risks losing value as a
reputational intermediary and as a result, future business.
The legal opinion of the reputational intermediary is deemed trustworthy
because the parties know that the attorney has a greater stake in its own reputation
than in the particular transaction. 188 However, if the attorney is not independent
from the seller, and has no greater vested interest in future business from other
clients, then the legal opinion becomes suspect. 189 For example, an in-house
corporate counsel is not independent and has a vested interest in the clientemployer and in the specific transaction. For this reason, most parties require a
legal opinion to be from outside counsel, not in-house counsel. Although
companies rely on in-house counsel for some functions, they look to outside
counsel in transactions where third-party verification is needed, such as public
190
offerings.
Another example that reflects the importance of being independent from
one's client in order to maintain value as a reputational intermediary is in the area
of governmental regulation. In guiding clients through the maze of governmental
controls, a lawyer or law firm does well to have a history of continuous fair
dealing with governmental agencies. If an attorney appears to have a pecuniary
interest beyond a standard fee in the client's regulatory pilgrimage, then the
attorney may be seen as suspect by the regulatory, agency.
3. Gatekeeper
In the litigation context, an attorney has a duty not to let a client give
testimony if the attorney knows that the testimony is false. 19 1 Therefore, if an
attorney is trustworthy, the court can assume that any testimony given is true

188 See Gilson, supra note 173, at 292-93 (pointing out that a legal opinion adds no new

information to the transaction, but it adds the element of reputation to that information).
189 See Okamoto, supra note 175, at 28 (noting that in-house counsel are

"nonreputational" lawyers who have lost independence due to capture).
190 See id. at 31 (stating that of 1617 S-1 filings, 96% of the legal opinions contained in
them were delivered by outside counsel and the majority of the remainder of the filings were
not true initial offerings, but spinoffs of substantial parent corporations); see also HAMILTON &
BOOTH, supra note 182, at 882 (stating that a buyer would refuse to accept a legal opinion from
an in-house lawyer); cf Gilson, supra note 173, at 2)1 (noting that companies anticipating
initial public offerings switch to "Big 8" auditors (now "Big 4")).
191 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3(4) (1983).
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unless it is impeached. This role of the attorney is a gatekeeping role. 192 In a
transactional context, corporate attorneys also play a gatekeeping role. The public
can assume that law firms, especially those with value as reputational
intermediaries, are carefully screening the clients that they accept. 19 3 Potential
investors may assume that if a prestigious law firm is representing an issuer, then
that issuer is trustworthy. Commercial banks may assume that a certain firm's
client that is seeking financing is also trustworthy.
This gatekeeping function obviously flows from a firm's function as a
reputational intermediary, but it is slightly different in that the law firm is
scrutinizing the client because of the firm's short-term and long-term interests.
The law firm is concerned about its continued success in the legal industry, but it
is also interested in collecting its fee for the current representation. If the law firm
questions the potential client's ability to guarantee payment of its substantial fee
or if the attorney knows the client routinely hires and fires counsel without paying
its bills, then the law firm will not accept the representation. Or, if an attorney
suspects at the outset of a representation that the client will not be forthcoming,
then the attorney may end the representation. In effect, a law firm's representation
of a client says, "I trust that this company will honor its pledges to me, so I can
recommend that you trust it as well."
Independence of the attorney is critical to the gatekeeping function. In order
to screen out certain clients, an attorney has to be objective about that client. All
attorneys are paid a fee for their services, so the threat of being bought by a client
exists in any representation. However, most reputational law firms will have the
luxury of choosing clients to accept, so this conflict is somewhat minimized if the
fee is relatively equal to the fee paid by other clients. Once one client represents a
large percentage of a law firm's business and the attorney's interests become too
aligned with the client's, then the attorney no longer appears to vouch for the
integrity of the client, but becomes the client's consigliere. 194

192 See Kritzer, supra note 123, at 22 (noting that highly lucrative cases are very rare); id.
at 24 (noting that because contingent fee lawyers only succeed if the cases they accept succeed,
attorneys screen out frivolous lawsuits).
193 See Okamoto, supra note 175, at 29 ("[H]igher reputation firms will act to protect their
investment in reputation by limiting their clientele to low-risk clients . . . of the highest
caliber.").
194 A national example of this phenomenon is the perceived capture of former Secretary
of State James Baker by the Bush family. See Michael Powell, The Wise Old Men, Leading Us
Through Gray Areas, WASH. POST, Nov. 15, 2000, at C1 (comparing independent "wise old
men" who historically consulted presidents and regarded "overt partisanship as gauche, not to
mention bad for business" with today's "consiglieres" posing as "wise old men," such as James
Baker, Vernon Jordan, and Bob Strauss). After advising President George W. Bush in the
contested presidential election of 2000, Secretary Baker has rarely been mentioned in the media
without the "consigliere" epithet. See, e.g., Michael Duffy, Franchise Player, TIME, Dec. 4,
2000, at 49; John Podhoritz, Bush Still Wins: The Supreme Court Was Right, N.Y. POST, Apr.
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V. So WHAT'S WRONG WITH THAT?

At first blush, taking an equity stake in a client may seem a little unattractive
or a little unsavory, 19 5 but not inherently unethical. In fact, the American Bar
Association and several state bar associations have recently announced that the
practice of taking equity in clients is not per se unethical, meaning the practice
does not automatically violate any ethical rules. 196 Inherent in the ABA Opinion
197
and the other state bar opinions, though, is an undercurrent of unease.
Commentators all agree that the practice is not prohibited by the rules, but some

characterize the practice as problematic. 198 This article contends that problems
arise because investing in clients impairs the attorney's ability to effectively
perform the roles of a transactional attorney.
A. Attorney-Investor as TransactionCost Engineer
As stated before, a corporate attorney acts as transaction cost engineer for a
client and attempts to reduce transactional costs and to design structures that will
minimize the risk of asymmetrical information in transactions. 199 To the extent
that an attorney is both aware of the client's goals and incentivized to work
toward those goals, the attorney can better fulfill the role of transaction cost

engineer. Put simply, an attorney is a better transaction cost engineer when the
attorney's and client's goals are more closely aligned.

6, 2001, at 29; Camelot Revisited-Young Members cf Presidential Clan in Drug Scandal,
GUARDIAN (London), Jan. 31, 2002, at 2, availableat 2002 WL 10982940.
195 See Manning, supra note 72 (quoting John Gould of Portland's Lane Powell Spears
Lubusky as saying: "All I can do is react with repugnance. Putting your money down is
reprehensible. That's not our business."); Blackwood, supra note 69 (quoting former chairman
of the California State Bar committee on professional responsibility as saying: "As
shareholders, can they really give independent advice?").
196 ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof I Resp., Formal Op. 418 (2000) [hereinafter 2000
ABA Op.].
197 See ABCNY Op., supra note 104:
[W]e state here our conclusion that there is no per se ethical prohibition on the acceptance
of shares or other securities, including options, as compensation for legal services to be
rendered. We hasten to add, however, our caution that such arrangements can present
thorny ethical and other issues that must be resolved prior to entering into an arrangement
in which a lawyer is to be compensated in client company securities.
See also John M. Burman, Conflicts of Interest: Business Transactionswith Clients, 21 Wyo.
LAW., Oct. 1998, at 13, 15 ("While the Wyoming Rules of Professional Conduct do not prohibit
lawyers from entering into business transactions with clients, they discourage them.").
198 See Suchman & Cahill, supra note 75, at 693-94 (noting that Silicon Valley law firms
interpret the ethical rules "less restrictively" than attorneys elsewhere).
199
See supra Part IV.B (regarding attorneys as transaction cost engineers).
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Many attorneys that engage in taking client equity advocate that this practice
aligns the attorney's and the client's goals, 200 and many clients agree. 20 1 As a
billing method, payment in equity alleviates some of the problems inherent in
hourly billing. 20 2 Although an attorney who bills by the hour would prefer that
the transaction fill his calendar for a longer time and result in a larger bill, the
attorney who is paid in equity is going to get the same percentage of the pie,
regardless of whether the transaction takes a few weeks, a few months, or a few
years. The equity fee will operate as a fixed fee and motivate the attorney to work
more efficiently. 20 3 In addition, the attorney's piece of the pie may be worth more
as the company is valued more, so the attorney has the same incentive as the
client to ensure that the quality of the services performed during the transaction is
sufficiently high. 20 4 This partnering aspect downplays the opposite pressure that
the flat fee might otherwise have on the attorney to rush the transaction through
and maximize the resulting fee received per time spent. 20 5 In theory, the attorney
will be motivated to work efficiently, to foresee and avoid potential obstacles to
the closing of the transaction, and to choose not to clutter the transaction with
unnecessary documents, negotiations, and resulting delays. In fact, these were
20 6
arguments made by law firms engaging in client investment during this period.
However, this theory must be analyzed further by exploring two questions:
"Who is the client?" and "What are the client's true goals?"
According to ethical rules, the corporate attorney's client is the
corporation. 20 7 The client is not the senior manager hiring the attorney, the inhouse counsel supervising the attorney, or even the current or future shareholders
of the corporation. This concept becomes especially troublesome when
200

See Miller, supra note 107, at 452 (theorizing that attorneys are effective when they
have a shared conception of value with their clients).
201 See id.at 451 (stating that start-up companies believe that granting equity to their
outside counsel motivates the attorney to facilitate the transaction more effectively).
202 See supra Part Il.B (discussing the inefficiencies of the hourly billing method).
203 See Manning, supra note 72 (quoting Adrian Russell-Falla, founder of Rulespace, as
stating that equity in lieu of fees ensures that attorneys "have an interest in working quickly and
efficiently").
204 One argument can be made that in an IPO situation, the efforts of the issuer counsel
will have a negative affect on the stock price. The more disclosures that are made, theoretically
the lower the offering price will be. Therefore, the efforts of the attorney should have an inverse
impact on the share price, at least short-term.
205 See Ullrick, supra note 46, at 31 (warning that an attorney paid a flat fee may not
spend the time necessary on a project if the fee is too low); Laurel L. Burke, Alternative Billing
Methods: Not Just by the Hour Anymore, 28 COLO. LAW. 59, 60 (Apr. 1999) (theorizing that an
attorney working under a flat fee will be less willing to be creative and more willing to cut
comers).

206 See Suchman & Cahill, supra note 75, at 697 (stating that Silicon Valley law firms see
themselves as facilitators, not "voices of caution" or "deal-killers").
207 See supra Part IV.A (discussing the corporate entity as the client).
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considered in the context of a start-up company. At the point at which the attorney
is contacted, the individual on the phone and the entity he or she represents seem
to be one and the same. Ms. Smith has a business plan to publish restaurant
reviews on the Internet. She has incorporated a business under the registered
name "WorthYourDiningDollar.com." She is the sole shareholder, the president,
and one of the directors. The other officers and directors are family members. In
the beginning, the goals of WorthYourDiningDollar.com and Ms. Smith seem to
be perfectly aligned. Ms. Smith wants to get the company up and running, and
she wants to obtain any necessary consents, intellectual property licenses, and
copyright permits for the content of the website. She wants to hire employees
who will research the restaurants and write the content of the website. She also
wants to obtain venture capital financing for the company. She wants her new
to be
attorney to be interdependent, not independent; 20 8 she wants the attorney
20 9
economically and emotionally invested in what she sees as her project.
However, at some point, the venture capitalists will give the project seed
money and become investors. They may even negotiate for slots as outside
directors. 2 10 Ms. Smith may, then, want either to offer shares of the business to
investors in a public offering or to have an existing concern acquire her business.
Her short-term goals of receiving cash for her shares of the company may become
inconsistent with the company's long-term goals..211 In addition, Ms. Smith and
212
other early investors may have goals that are inconsistent with future investors.
Majority shareholders may have goals that are inconsistent with minority
shareholders. 2 13 Ms. Smith may have goals that are inconsistent with the outside
directors. 2 14 With whose goals will the attorney be aligned?

208 See Suchman & Cahill, supra note 75, at 683 (noting that the "integrative role" of
attorneys as "key players in an informal apparatus of socialization, coordination, and
normalization ... becomes most notable in interactions between Silicon Valley lawyers and the
region's high-technology entrepreneurs and venture capitalists").
209

See Lashinsky, supra note 73, at 136 (citing Craig Johnson of VLG as saying that
clients want their outside counsel to make a commitment to the company).
210 See KLEIN & COFFEE, supra note 42, at 131 (describing three types of directors: (1)
inside directors, who are also officers or employees; (2) outside directors, who are truly
independent; and (3) directors who have an external relationship with the corporation such as
outside attorneys and investment bankers).
211 See Suchman & Cahill, supra note 75, at 688 (stating that most venture capital funds
demand relinquishment of corporate control by the founder).
212 See

id. at 694 (noting the inherent conflict between shareholders and founders).
& COFFEE, supra note 42, at 170-71 (remarking that because of this conflict,

213 KLEIN

some courts have imposed on majority shareholders fiduciary duties to minority shareholders).

See Beck, supra note 81, at 153 (describing a founder of a start-up client of Cooley
Godward as concerned that the venture capital fund Cooley paired it with was trying to take
control of the board now that the fund had outside directors sitting on the board).
214
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Although making the attorney a shareholder would seem to align the interests
of attorney and client, the result is not as clear.2 15 The attorney's economic
interests become that of a shareholder who intends to sell the stake at the earliest
opportunity, usually six months. A law firm who receives its fees in company
stock cannot hold on to the stock indefinitely, or the firm will face problems of
liquidity. 216 Stock cannot pay the rent on offices or salaries of employees.
Therefore, the attorney may have an interest that is aligned only with the venture
capitalists, the underwriters, or other early investors and not with the long-term
goals of the corporate entity.
For example, assume that WorthYourDiningDollar.com is working toward
an initial public offering. The attomey-investor is working on the disclosure
statements for that offering. The attorney is concerned about some statements that
Ms. Smith and the underwriter have provided. The attorney feels that the
statements may be misleading, but without further investigation, the attorney is
unsure. If the attorney investigates and has the suspicions confirmed, then the IPO
may be delayed indefinitely. If the attorney does not mention anything, then the
IPO will be successful and well-timed. 2 17 However, future events in the next one
to three years may then bring the statements to light and subject the company to
scrutiny, lawsuits, and stock price decline. The attorney who risks events of this
type has not alleviated the transaction costs for the client and in fact has
substituted early, low transaction costs for larger ones in the future. But, as an
early investor who wants to sell shares in the next six to twelve months, the
economic pressure urges the attorney not to investigate and instead to complete
the IPO. 2 18 If the equity fee is contingent on the closing of the IPO, the economic
pressure is even greater. In addition, the greater the potential payoff, the greater
the pressure. 2 19 Remember, many law firms have realized gains in the tens of

215 Cf Roberta Romano, The Shareholder Suit: Litigation Without Foundation? 7 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 55, 81-82 (1991) (noting that in a study of shareholder suits, more lawsuits were
filed against managers with large ownership stakes because inside ownership increases

opportunities for self-dealing).

216 A law firm that is making an investment in addition to receiving its ordinary legal fees,
however, has more control of the timing of selling shares.
217 See Suchman & Cahill, supra note 75, at 687 (pointing out that the high-tech industry

is a "time-sensitive environment" in which even small delays in getting funding and getting to
the market may effectively destroy the commercial viability of a start-up company with a fresh
idea).
218 Cf 2000 ABA Op., supra note 196 (describing the circumstance where a lawyer may

be called upon to render an opinion in a venture capital transaction in which the lawyer would
otherwise advise the client to reveal material adverse financial information, but the disclosure
might cause the venture capital party to decline to close the transaction).
219 See id. (advising that if the stock of the client is the lawyer's major asset, then her
representation of the corporation would be affected adversely, causing her to withdraw under
Model Rule 1.7(b)).
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millions on IPO day. 220 Therefore, paying the attorney in stock in lieu of a fee has
not aligned the economic interest of the attorney with the long-term goals of the
company, but in fact has created a very large conflict of interest.22 1 The attorney
is not interdependent with the entity, just with the founder and venture capital
fund investors. Although the attorney-investor may be an effective transactional
cost engineer for certain constituencies who want to take the company public
quickly and cash in stock options, the attorney will not effectively be reducing
long-term transaction costs for the entity.
This eagerness to close the transaction is not only theoretically possible in the
arena of spotting disclosure issues, but it is clearly evident in the fact that Silicon
Valley law firms are reportedly doing deals very quickly by drafting documents
that are shorter, have looser terms, and are not fiercely negotiated. 22 2 In fact,
lawyers have a reputation for being not only "efficient," but also
Silicon Valley
"sloppy." 223
Interestingly, an attorney will be less likely to have a conflict of interest with
the client, the corporation, when the attorney holds a small percentage interest,
intends on holding that interest as a long-term investment, and that interest is not
significant in the attorney's entire portfolio. 224 But in this instance, the client's
stated goal of having a "partner" will also probably not be achieved. In sum, a
founder of a start-up company wants outside counsel to be a co-founder.
However, a corporate attorney cannot realistically be a co-founder. On the one
hand, co-founders are thoroughly invested and cannot easily cash out of the
enterprise. A law firm is engaged in the practice of law, not in the practice of
being patrons to promising ventures. Practically, law firms cannot tie up firm
profits in that way. Professionally, a law firm cannot fulfill its role as a transaction
cost engineer and be a co-founder at the same time.

220 See supra Part III.C (chronicling huge gain; by VLG and Wilson Sonsini from
investments in clients).
221 ABCNY Op., supra note 104 (determining that a lawyer's professional judgment
would likely be adversely affected so that the attorney would not advise a client to disclose
negative information for fear of the transaction not being completed).
222 See Suchman & Cahill, supra note 75, at 696--97 (reporting that Silicon Valley firms
reject the "belt and suspenders" approach to documenting transactions and have abandoned
"lawyerly caution"); see also Renee Deger, Wilson Settles Client Flap, RECORDER (San
Francisco), Oct. 26, 1999, at I (reporting that Wilson Sonsini settled a $5 million malpractice
claim in which entrepreneurs claimed that the wrong name appeared on final documents in
connection with the acquisition of their company, in which Wilson Sonsini owned shares).
223 See Leslie A. Gordon, Lawyers Are Lawyer. Manhattan Lawyers Find Common
ProfessionalGroundwith Valley Counterparts,OF COUNSEL, Oct. 9, 2000, at 13.
224
See 2000 ABA Op., supra note 196 (noting that law firm policies that minimize
conflicts with the interests of clients "may include limiting the investment to an insubstantial
percentage of stock and the amount invested in any single client to a nonmaterial sum").
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B. Attorney-Investor as ReputationalIntermediary
The nature of being a reputational intermediary rests in the attorney's
independence from any particular client. 225 A reputational law firm is a long-term
player in the business industry. This law firm has survived many different
business trends and expects to be viable after the current trend is over. With this
reputation, a law firm gives a client the needed reputational clout to negotiate with
226
third parties and the government.
Consider, however, whether the attorney for the buyer in an acquisition with
final-period problems would advise his buyer-client that he is comfortable with
the assurances of the law firm for the seller if the buyer's attorney knew that the
seller's law firm had a significant economic stake in the closing of the transaction.
In an ordinary transaction, the buyer's attorney knows that the seller's law firm
will probably be presenting the seller with a bill for hundreds of thousands of
dollars, which is probably payable whether or not the transaction closes. The
buyer's attorney knows that the seller may get angry if the transaction does not
close and may not hire its law firm again. But, the buyer's attorney knows that the
seller's law firm has a stable of clients and a fine reputation that continually
attracts new clients. The buyer's attorney knows that the seller's law firm
logically would not risk its own reputation for the seller, one of its many
clients. 2 27
Now consider a different scenario. The seller's law firm has deferred its fees
in lieu of equity or an investment opportunity. Therefore, the attorney now knows
that the law firm will make between $10 and $50 million if the transaction closes
and nothing if the transaction does not close. The attorney also learns that the law.
firm has begun performing more and more business services for clients, so that it
only handles about 15 clients a year. Will the attorney assume that the law firm
again will not risk its reputation just to close the transaction? 22 8 The law firm has
lost its credibility as a reputational intermediary. 229 Much as an in-house lawyer
225 See supra Part IV.B.2 (discussing the nature of an attorney as a reputational
intermediary); see also Okamoto, supra note 175, at 28 (describing in-house counsel, with one
client, as the clearest case of a non-independent lawyer).
226 See Okamoto, supra note 175, at 45 (explaining that because lawyers are "repeat
players," they can benefit clients who, as infrequent visitors to the arena, have no reputation).
227 See HAMILTON & BooTH, supra note 182 (noting that a law firm only operates as a

reputational intermediary when the law firm has more to lose by renting its reputation than to
gain by cheating).

228 See Suchman & Cahill, supra note 75, at 696 (reporting that Silicon Valley firms are
acting as insurers and giving legal opinions that "might not be totally 100% right" just to keep

the transaction alive).
229 In an analysis of U.S. law firms with the highest reputational bonds, and the highest
"rent" for those bonds, the law firms with "lock-step" compensation for attorneys have the
strongest bonds and can charge premium rent for those bonds. Law firms with entreprenurial
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who has her economic future entangled with the company is considered captured
and not able to function as a reputational intermediary for that company, the law
firm who has partnered with the start-up company and tied its economic success
to the success of that start-up may also be perceived as captured.2 30
Unfortunately, a law firm's reputational value is easy to lose. A law firm may
act with utmost integrity and still be seen as captured because the numbers at
stake are so high. Knowing that a law firm will receive an unusually high benefit
from the closing of an IPO makes the law firm instantly suspect. 23 1 Even if the
law firm has set up a separate investment fund with a diverse portfolio, the
appearance of a conflict will be enough to damage its position as a reputational
intermediary. In addition, if even a few law firms with this type of conflict are
proven to have acted as poor transaction cost engineers and committed
malpractice or securities fraud, the value of any member of the legal profession as
a reputation intermediary will be diminished.232

C. Attorney-Investor as Gatekeeper
The third unique role that a corporate attorney plays in the business world is
that of gatekeeper. A law firm will only agree to represent clients that it believes it
can trust. In a securities offering scenario, a law firm must counsel the client to
make certain disclosures required by law. If a law firm, therefore, represents a
particular client then that client must be the kind of client that complies with
applicable laws.233 Therefore, if the law firm has a good reputation, the public
compensation create incentives for individual lawyers to sacrifice the interest of the law firm for
the benefit of a single client. One commentator hypothesizes that this incentive is the reason
why firms with that type of compensation structure cannot charge as a high a premium on its
reputational bond as lock-step prestige firms. See Okamoto, supra note 175, at 41-43.
230 See Gilson, supra note 173, at 290 (warning that a reputational intermediary is only
valuable if no "final-period problem" is associated with the intermediary's pledge; therefore, if
the attorney has the same motivation not to be trusted a the client, then the attorney will not be
an effective reputational intermediary).
231 See Cole, supra note 136, at 55 (quoting a former SEC administrator as saying, "If a
company is going public, and the law firm representing it is a shareholder, it looks like a
conflict. It is not a good thing.").
232 See infra Part VII (discussing the stigma borne by the accounting industry in the
aftermath of accounting scandals surrounding Enron Corp. and WorldCom).
233 This gatekeeping function has been codified to some extent by SEC rules promulgated
pursuant to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. 17 C.F.R. pt. 205 (2003). These rules, which
received substantial feedback during the comment period, require an attorney representing a
corporation to report evidence of"material" securities violations "up the ladder," and then allow
that attorney to reveal confidential information regarding those violations if necessary. See id.
§ 205.3(b) (outlining steps an attorney must take when she "becomes aware of evidence of a
material violation by the issuer, or by an officer, director, employee, or agent of the issuer.").
Proposed rules that would create a "noisy exit" of fired or withdrawn attorneys are currently
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will see those clients as trustworthy, too. 234 However, once a law firm loses either
its independence or its reputational status, it cannot adequately function as a
gatekeeper. By taking substantial equity positions in its clients and partnering
with them as seed investors, a law firm will not be seen as a gatekeeper. To the
public, the law firm will be seen as renting its reputation to the highest bidder. In
litigation parlance, the law firm has become a "hired gun," and its clients will not
benefit from the law firm's position in the community. The law firm will be seen
as selecting its clients on the basis of "upside" alone, and not on trustworthiness.
Proponents of attomeys investing in clients argue that law firms do provide a
gatekeeper role precisely by choosing to become investors. 235 Why, they ask,
would the public want to invest in a company when its own lawyers, who have
236
more information, would not make the same investment?
First, the lawyer may not be making the same investment as the public. The
23 7
Most
lawyer may be getting its equity stake at no cost or at a low cost.
investors would accept free stock or stock for a nominal amount in any company
without much scrutiny.
238
Second, and more important, screening investments is not gatekeeping.
The role of the gatekeeper is to keep unscrupulous or untrustworthy players out of
the industry. Whether a company is unscrupulous is not always connected to
whether someone is willing to bet that its stock will increase from its initial
offering price over the next six months. If that is the function of a gatekeeper, then
an investment banker, who generally has more education and experience in the
area, will serve that function better than an attomey. 239 To be a true gatekeeper,
proposed but not final. See id. § 205.3(d)) (requiring an attorney who reports evidence of
violations to no avail to withdraw from the representation and file a notice with the SEC).
234 See Wilkins, supra note 16, at 1164 (discussing the role of lawyers in counseling

clients to avoid prohibited conduct).
235 See Suchman & Cahill, supra note 75, at 697-98 (naming gatekeeping, proselytizing,
and sorting as corporate attorney's roles in Silicon Valley).
236 See Miller, supra note 107, at 450-51 (asserting that attorney-investors act as
gatekeepers by screening potential clients for fundability and then acting as monitors for
venture capital funds).
237 See Orenstein, supra note 100, at 146 (reporting that VLG demands "founders stock,"
inexpensive stock usually reserved for founders).

238 See Suchman & Cahill, supranote 75, at 699 (asserting that firms in Silicon Valley act
as gatekeepers by selecting clients based on knowledge of which kinds of business plans go
forward and which do not).
239 Investment bankers, like accountants and attorneys, also function as reputational
intermediaries. Gilson, supra note 173, at 299. Unlike attorneys and accountants, however,
investments bankers are not seen as independent, but as sellers of their clients. They regularly
buy stock in issuer clients, and they make their fees contingent on the launch of that issue.
Furlonger, supra note 19, at 95-96. The reputational value is therefore different from that of an
independent attorney or accountant. Investment bankers do not lend their reputation to
overcome final-period problems between two parties, but to add a premium to the stock price in

OHIO STATE LA WJOURVAL

[Vol. 64:897

and vouch to the public that the client is trustworthy, the gatekeeper must be
independent. To make a pedestrian analogy, if a friend were "setting you up" with
a member of the opposite sex, would you feel better or worse if the friend making
the recommendation were the prospect's mother?
Finally, the practice of taking stock in one's client in lieu of a fee has the
opposite effect of gatekeeping, even assuming that a function of being a
gatekeeper is vouching for a client's creditworthiness. An argument often cited
for deferring fees in lieu of equity for start-up clients is that these clients may not
otherwise be able to afford good legal representation. 240 Proponents analogize
these clients to the meritorious plaintiffs who could not have their day in court if
plaintiffs lawyers were not allowed to enter into contingent fee agreements with
them. 24 1 The start-up clients are usually in the process of looking for venture
capital and currently do not have cash to pay for many start-up services.242
Therefore, the mere fact that an attorney is taking equity in lieu of fees could be
evidence that the client is not creditworthy.243 The client may have a great
business plan and just be cash-poor, but the client may also not have enough seed
money, may not have good business acumen, and may continually have liquidity
244
problems.

an offering. To the public, the reputation is secured by the investment bank's long-term interest
in maintaining its status as a broker-dealer with the National Association of Securities Dealers
and as a repeat player in the capital markets.
240 But see Orenstein, supra note 100, at 142 (stating that many Silicon Valley firms
required equity from new clients).
241 See Miller, supra note 107, at 442-43 (analogizing equity in lieu of fees to contingent
fees that "remedy situations where a client cannot bring a meritorious claim because of
insufficient resources").
242 See Goodman, supra note 78 (interviewing one advertising executive whose agency
had accepted equity in return for services in twelve new ventures and one publicist who also
had traded services for equity in approximately twelve start-up companies).
243 In a way, the market of start-up clients who wish to pay for legal services with stock or
stock options may be seen as a "market of lemons." Similar to the market for used cars, which
discounts price because the sellers of used cars are a self-selecting group of car owners unhappy
with their cars, the market for legal services payable in equity may be made up of self-selected
buyers who are generally unable to pay cash for legal selvices. Although not all used cars are
lemons and not all cash-poor legal services buyers are uncreditworthy, the market may view
them as so. See generally George A. Akerlof, The Marketfor "Lemons ": Quality Uncertainty
andthe Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488,488-90 (1970).
244 But see Suchman & Cahill, supra note 75, at 693 (noting that taking equity in lieu of
fees increases access to legal services for start-ups who are creditworthy but just have a
different "life cycle").
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D. Other Roles-Attorney-Investor as Loyal Counselor
Clients and attorneys also argue that giving and receiving client equity as fees
increases the attorney's loyalty to the client and enables the attorney to be a longterm counselor. 245 The reality has proven the opposite. A client may think that
allowing an attorney to get in on the ground floor of a great business idea and to
receive a handsome fee for taking that business public would certainly secure that
attorney's loyalty and availability for future representation. However, the actions
of the Silicon Valley law firms seem to prove that all that client did was whet the
attorney's appetite for representing start-up companies in lPOs. 24 6 These same
law firms decline to continue to represent clients once those companies go
public. 24 7 Busy with other start-up companies that promise "upside," law firms do
not have the time to handle the less lucrative, routine legal tasks of public
companies. 24 8 These actions do not support the argument that paying attorneys in
equity builds client loyalty.
VI. FINE LINE BETWEEN PLEASURE AND PAIN:
LIABILITY CONCERNS OF INVESTING IN CLIENTS
The purpose of analyzing how investing in a client may create conflicts of
interest between the attorney and the client and a loss of reputational or
gatekeeping ability from the public's perspective is to show that the law firm is
facing a risk greater than just the loss of the investment. In a perfect transaction,
everyone is happy. If the client has seen the stock price in an IPO go high and stay
high, the client will see the attorney's share as a well-spent cost of doing business.
The public who bought shares in the IPO will be satisfied, and the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) will keep busy with other matters. However, if the
transaction goes awry, then these conflicts, which may be molehills, will look like
mountains. If the stock price in an IPO goes high then plummets, the shareholders

245 See Baker, supra note 7, at 37 (stating that clients view attorney investments as a sign
of loyalty); Miller, supra note 107, at 452 (asserting that attorneys who invest in clients are
developing a long-term relationship with that client as a "partner for life").
246 See Beck, supra note 81, at 69 (noting that in Silicon Valley, big public companies are

undesirable and that associates prefer to work with entrepreneurs).
247 See id. at 69 ("It's not uncommon to hear of a valley law firm dumping a client after it
goes public and after the firm has scored a bundle on its stock.").
248 See id. at 251 (reporting that the Cooley Godward committee instituted in 1999 to
screen new clients also weeded out 100 existing clients in that year); Osborne, supra note 138
(reporting that VLG relegates compliance work after companies go public to in-house counsel
or other outside firms).
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will look to the issuer. The SEC will look to the issuer.249 The issuer will look to
the law firm, which will cause the shareholders and the SEC to look to the law
firm. All of a sudden, the law firm's ingenious agenda of taking equity in clients
will be highly scrutinized.

A. EthicalRules
Taking stock in one's client as all or part of'a fee does not violate any ethical
250
rule on its face. Rule 1.8 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct,
promulgated by the ABA, states:
(a) A lawyer shall not enter into a business transaction with a client or
knowingly acquire an ownership, possessory, security or other pecuniary interest
adverse to a client unless:
(1) the transaction and the terms on which the lawyer acquires the interest
are fair and reasonable to the client and are fully disclosed and transmitted in
writing to the client in a manner which can be reasonably understood by the
client;
(2) the client is given a reasonable opportunity to seek the advice of
independent counsel in the transaction; and
(3)the client consents in writing thereto.
Accepting equity in a client constitutes a "business transaction" under Rule
1.8.251 The rules treat accepting equity in lieu of a fee and investing firm funds in
the client as the same for purposes of Rule 1.8, as long as the opportunity to invest
252
is offered in connection with the law firm agreeing to provide legal services.
Due to growing concern over the trend of lawyers investing in start-up clients, the
ABA issued a formal ethics opinion in 2000, advising lawyers that the Model
Rules do not prohibit the practice. 253 However, the ABA warns that a lawyer
engaging in this practice must conform with Rule 1.8 and disclose the potential
conflict to the client, advise the client to seek independent legal advice, and obtain
the Client's consent in writing.254 In addition, the fee must comply with Rule
255
1.8(a)'s requirement that the transaction be "fair and reasonable to the client

249

See John Pletz, Market Downturn Feeds Lawsuit Boom, AUSTIN AM. STATESMAN,
Dec. 10, 2001, at D I (reporting that twice as many security class action lawsuits were filed in
2001 than in 2000).
250 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8(a)(1)-(3) (1983).
251 2000 ABA Op., supra note 196.

252 Id.
253 ld.
254

Id.

255 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8(a) (1983).
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and with Rule 1.5(a)'s requirement that the fee be "reasonable. '256 Other
jurisdictions have also construed their identical or similar ethical rules 257 to allow
lawyers to take equity in their clients given the same safeguards. 258
In practice, the requirement that the attorney obtain a written consent from
the client that outlines the potential conflicts may not be as meaningful as the
rules seem to anticipate. In 2000, if a client wanted to hire one of many certain
Silicon Valley firms to represent a start-up company and guide the company
259
through an IPO, then that client was required to give up equity to the law firm.
In this scenario, the client's written consent may not be meaningful because the
client has no other viable option than to give the consent. The client, who is
probably not sophisticated or experienced in business or law, 260 is desperate to
have representation in an industry with more buyers of legal services than
sellers. 26 1 Another equally realistic scenario is that the client cannot pay in cash,
but can only pay for legal services in stock or stock options. In this scenario, a
written consent will be easy to obtain from the client, but may not serve the
purposes of the rules. 262 To have clients like this waive a legal conflict is much
2 56

Id.R. 1.5(a).
257 Compare N.Y. CODE PROF'L. RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-104(A) (2001) (requiring
disclosure if attorney and client will have "differing" interests in a business transaction), with
MODEL RuLES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8(a) (2003) (requiring disclosure for "adverse"
interests).
258 See also Passante v. McWilliam, 53 Cal. App. 4th 1240, 1247-49 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997)
(voiding an oral promise of a corporation to pay outside attorney an equity interest, which
skyrocketed to $33 million in value, reasoning that (1) the promise was not enforceable because
it lacked consideration and (2) even if the promise was enforceable, the agreement would then
violate Rule 3-300 of the Califomia Rules of Professional Conduct because the attorney did not
advise the client in writing to seek the advice of an independent attorney); Weiss v. Statewide
Grievance Comm., 633 A.2d 282, 288-89 (Conn. 1993) (upholding reprimand of attorney for
receiving an 18% interest in client in exchange for legal services without disclosing that the
ownership interest would create "differing interest" and obtaining a written consent pursuant to
Disciplinary Rule 5-104(A) of the Code of Professional Responsibility); State v. Bennett, 810
P.2d 661, 664-65 (Colo. 1991) (suspending attorney for accepting an offer to purchase a
percentage of his client's business without disclosing the potential for conflicts of interest in
violation of Colo. D.R. 5-104(A)).
259
See supra Part III.A (discussing the practice of many Silicon Valley firms to require
equity from clients before accepting representation).
260
See Suchman & Cahill, supra note 75, at 688 (noting that many unsophisticated
founders of high-tech start-ups are former engineers or even worse, academics).
261 See ABCNY Op., supra note 104 ("Principals in startup companies typically entering
into 'securities for fees' arrangements may be legally unsophisticated and may be relying on the
attorney with respect to the transaction.").
262 See Gwyneth E. McAlpine, Comment, Getting a Piece of the Action: Should Lawyers
Be Allowed to Invest in Their Clients' Stock?, 47 UCLA L. REv. 549, 583-84 (1999)
(remarking that a client may fear turning down a request for investment by prospective attorney
so that equity becomes a forced cost of doing business for a start-up).
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like having a debt-ridden individual sign a waiver of any applicable usury laws
263
before obtaining a loan from a loan shark.
According to the ABA Opinion, the reasonableness of the fee will be
determined at the time of the fee agreement according to the factors listed in Rule
1.5(a):
(1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions
and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly;
(2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the
particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer;
involved,

(3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services;
(4) the amount involved and the results obtained;

(5)the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances;
(6)the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client;
(7)the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers
performing the services; and
(8)whether the fee is fixed or contingent. 264
Although the ABA Opinion is clear that the reasonableness requirement applies to
the value of the stock at the time that the agreement is made, the Opinion advises
attorneys to provide an estimate of the cost of the legal services and receive an
265
amount of stock equal to that cost.
This requirement of the rules seems the most troublesome. Attorneys who
accept equity in their clients do so because they anticipate that the stock will
increase dramatically in value. The pre-IPO stock the attorney receives may have
very little value, but after the company goes public, the stock may be very
valuable. This dynamic might prove problematic to an attorney who has to prove
that the value of the stock as a fee was reasonable. 266 Few jurors would believe
that a fee in the tens of millions for taking a company public was reasonable when
the traditional hour-based fee would be in the hundreds of thousands. 267 At the
outset of the representation, the attorney is accepting the risk that the stock may
never appreciate in value or have a secondary market. When viewed ex ante, the

263 In Texas, parties to a loan agreement may not contractually waive usury law
protection. Miles v. Kelly, 25 S.W. 724, 724-25 (Tex. Civ. App. 1894).
264 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.5(a)(1)-(8) (1983).
265 2000 ABA Op., supra note 196.
266 Ronald C. Minkoff, EthicalConsiderationsfor Attorneys Involved in Venture Capital
Transactions,in PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, 1267 CORPORATE LAW AND PRACTICE COURSE

HANDBOOK SERIES 917 (2001) (noting that determining whether a "stock-for-fee" is reasonable
is difficult).
267 See E. Gregory Martin & Michael G. Martin, When Doing Deals Is Risky: Don't Get
Involved in a Client's Business Unless You 'rePreparedto Cover Losses, A.B.A. J., July 1996,

at 80, 80 (1996).
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fee could always seem reasonable, having little value at all.2 68 If the attorney were
to require equity equal to the normal fee, say $250,000, that amount of equity
may be a huge percentage of the worth of the company at the time that the legal
representation is secured. 269 The ABA Opinion also recommends against taking
large percentages. In addition, if the company goes public, that $250,000 worth of
stock might become hundreds of millions.
However, the problems inherent in assessing the reasonableness of an equitybased fee are the same problems inherent in any type of contingency fee. The
lawyer may collect nothing or collect a windfall. Contingency fees in personal
injury litigation have been upheld even though the personal injury lawyer may
collect a fee that seems unreasonable in hindsight. Because of the possibility of
conflicts of interest, in New York, contingent fees in litigation are not
recommended when the litigants could otherwise afford to pay an hourly fee. 270
Courts have concluded that the attorney is accepting a risk of no fee or a very
small fee and that without contingent fees, meritorious plaintiffs may not be able
to obtain representation. For the same reasons, windfall equity-based fees may
also be seen as reasonable after taking into consideration the risk that the attorney
assumed at the beginning of the representation. However, if the risk is small, then
1
the fee may be seen as unreasonable. 27
In addition to the application of these rules at the outset of a representation, if
the existence of the stock ownership creates a conflict of interest during the
representation or adversely affects the attorney's professional judgment during the
representation, then the attorney may have to withdraw from the representation
under Rule 1.7(b). 272 If the conflict gives rise to a reasonable belief that the

268 But see ABCNY Op., supra note 104 (warning that under DR 2-106(A) not all client
securities will be deemed reasonable fees, particularly if the risks are minimal and the amount

of securities is excessive in relation to the services rendered).
269 See Howard, supra note 68 (musing whether it is "fair and reasonable" to accept
$50,000 in stock options that have a good probability of becoming worth millions of dollars).
270 N.Y. CODE PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 2-20 (2001). This line of reasoning has never
been persuasive to me. As a finance attorney, I was surprised to learn that in Texas, the usury
rates for loans involving manufactured housing and used cars were higher than for other loans.
The argument for the higher rate is that, without the incentive for lenders, low-income
purchasers of these goods would not be able to obtain financing. My response was that the lowincome purchasers of these goods are exactly the types of people who should be protected from
gouging lenders. Conversely, New York has a logical usury law that has exceptions not for
consumers of low-income housing but for corporate borrowers and borrowers of over
$250,000. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW §§ 5-521(1), 5-501(6)(a) (2002).
271 See ABCNY Op., supra note 104; Kan. B.A. Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 6 (1998)
("If such fees result in abnormally high hourly rates on a comparison basis and when there is
little time or risk in the case, the fees are considered to be unreasonable.").
272 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7(b) (1983); 2000 ABA Op., supra note 196
(stating that if a lawyer cannot maintain the "requisite professional independence" of an
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representation would be adversely affected, this conflict is not waivable by the
client.273 In an IPO setting, if the economic pressure of a large, contingent stock
fee is significant enough to conceivably cause an attorney to commit malpractice,
then the same pressure would cause that attorney not to withdraw from the
representation and lose the fee entirely.
Finally, if the equity accepted by the attorney can be characterized as a fee or
consideration for legal services, a written agreement between client and attorney
should formalize the terms of that fee arrangement. 274 Because this fee could be
27 5
seen as contingent, Model Rule 1.5(c) may apply.
Attorneys who do accept equity in a start-up client with the expectation of
sharing in a large increase in the stock price should realize that if anyone involved
in the transaction has a disappointing outcome, then the fee may look
unreasonable to the media, the public, or a jury.276 If litigation should ensue
against the attorney, the attorney will have the burden of proving both that the
277
client freely consented to the fee arrangement and that the fee was reasonable.
Two types of litigation might be brought against an attorney in which a huge
equity interest as a legal fee might make the; attorney's actions suspect: a
malpractice action and a securities fraud action.
B. Legal Action by Client: Breach of FiduciayDuty & Legal Malpractice
A client who believes that his attorney has not provided honest or competent
legal representation may seek redress in a legal malpractice action or in a breach
of fiduciary duty action. Recognition of the fiduciary duty between the attorney
and the client originated in equity. 278 Part of this duty is to act with undivided
loyalty and to avoid conflicts of interest. 279 Because of the fiduciary nature of the
attorney for her client and ignore her economic interest as a shareholder, then she must
withdraw).
273 2000 ABA Op., supra note 196.
274 See Richard Brust, Stocking up on Fees. Clients May Pay Attorneys with Shares if
They Understandthe Transaction,PanelSays, A.B.A. J., Sept. 2000, at 69, 69.
275 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.5(c) (2003).

276 See Burman, supra note 197, at 15 ('The courts, too, view lawyer-client business
transactions with skepticism. That skepticism is rooted n the fiduciary nature of the lawyerclient relationship, where the lawyer must subordinate his or her interests to the client's.").
277 See id. at 16 (citing Comm. on Prof'l Ethics & Conduct v. Mershon, 316 N.W.2d 895,
899 (owa 1982) ("[The] safest and perhaps best course would [be] to refuse to participate
personally in the transaction.")).
278 See Meredith J. Duncan, Legal Malpractice by Any Other Name: Why a Breach of
FiduciaryDuty Claim Does Not Smell as Sweet, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1137, 1148 (1999).
279
See id. at 1153; see also Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Death of FiduciaryDuty in Close
Corporations, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1675, 1686 (1990) (noting that the law approves of
fiduciaries being disqualified from sharing ownership interests with the beneficiary to avoid the
fiduciary's having to balance those competing interests).
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relationship, if a client ever calls into question the equity in lieu of fee
arrangement, the attorney will face a rebuttable presumption that he used undue
influence over the client in securing that fee arrangement. 280 This presumption
may be made difficult to rebut if the attorney required the fee arrangement before
agreeing to represent the client and the client was unsophisticated and in desperate
need of both legal representation and capital. The presumption would also be
more difficult to rebut if the attorney-client relationship was already in place at
the time of the equity request by the attorney, and the relationship was
characterized by the unsophisticated client relying on the attorney in both legal
and business matters. If the presumption cannot be rebutted, then the transaction
2 81
is voidable and the lawyer must disgorge all profits from the representation.
Because courts view business transactions with clients with intense scrutiny, an
attorney will want to avoid this type of litigation.
A disappointed client whose business venture has gone south may also seek
to recover from the attorney in the form of a malpractice lawsuit.282 If a client is
pressured into bankruptcy because of shareholder lawsuits, then the client or the
bankruptcy trustee may turn to the attorney and allege that the client's legal
problems are a result of relying on the improper advice of counsel, who had a
large economic stake in now questionable transactions. This type of lawsuit
would be grounded in negligence, and a plaintiff would have to establish the basic
elements of duty, breach of duty, causation, and harm. 2 83 An attorney who
realized tens of millions of dollars in the months following an IPO will not look
very sympathetic to a jury when compared to a defunct company and
shareholders who collectively lost millions (or billions) of dollars in the year or
two following the IPO. Although the plaintiff will have a difficult hurdle in
proving that the attorney breached his professional duty of care and that this
breach was the cause of the client's downward spiral, defending the lawsuit will
284
be costly both in terms of dollars and reputation for the law firm involved.

280 See McAlpine, supra note 262, at 560 ('To rebut the presumption of undue influence,
the lawyer must show that he acted in good faith, that the transaction was fair to the client, that
there was full disclosure of the lawyer's interest, and that there was no overreaching or fraud by
the lawyer.").
281 See Duncan, supra note 278, at 1161.
282 See Howard, supra note 68 (reporting that one malpractice lawyer had received a
number of complaints regarding attomey-investors).
283 See Duncan, supra note 278, at 1141.
284 See Howard, supra note 68 (stating a multi-millionaire attorney would find it difficult
and expensive to defend himself in front of a blue-collar jury even if the lawsuit only involved
the appearance of impropriety).
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C. Legal Action by Shareholders:Securities FraudViolations
The largest unknown risk that a law firm faces when investing in its clients is
whether the law firm will be named and eventually held liable in a securities fraud
lawsuit.2 85 The bursting of the technology bubble has created a new wave of
securities lawsuits. 286 Shareholders lost huge sums after buying stocks at inflated
prices and then watching those prices plummet and, in some cases, the issuers
declare bankruptcy. 287 The size of the losses has driven many shareholders to file
securities fraud cases, many in the Southern District of New York.288 These
lawsuits may also spawn ancillary litigation against attorneys. 28 9 In addition, the
recent accounting scandals and daily restatements of earnings by large
corporations have spawned new lawsuits, many with accounting firms as
defendants. 290 The outcomes of these lawsuits will predict how attorneys will be
29 1
treated in similar lawsuits.
Prior to the mid-1990s, secondary parties such as accountants and attorneys
could be named in shareholder lawsuits for violations of Section 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934292 and Rule l0b-5 promulgated thereunder 29 3 as

285 See Blackwood, supra note 69 (quoting the chairman of the California State Bar
committee on professional responsibility as saying that being a defendant in a securities lawsuit
was one possible unknown intaking equity in a client).
286 See Richard P. Swanson & Richard Y. Roberts, The Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act of 1995: A Review of the Law and Recent Developments, in A.L.I./A.B.A.,
ACCOUNTANT'S LIABILrrY 105, 109 (2002) (stating that hundreds of new securities lawsuits
were filed in 2001 as a result of the end of the technology-driven bull market).
287 See Hearing on Enron Energy Services Corporate Responsibility Before the Senate
Subcomm. on Consumer Affairs, Foreign Commerce and Tourism of the Sen. Comm. on
Commerce, Science and Transp., Cong. (2002) (July 18, 2002) (statement of Joan Claybrook,
President, Public Citizen) (testifying that American investors have lost $7trillion in investments
since March 2000) [hereinafter Claybrook Testimony].
288 See Swanson & Roberts, supra note 286, at 109 (attributing the growth in securities
fraud cases to a group of IPO allocation cases filed in the Southern District of New York
"which involve virtually every initial public offering made in the past several years").
289 See Howard, supra note 68 ("Someplace down the road there are going to be failures,
and other investors are going to say, 'You, the law firm, did not adequately convey to us what
we should have known because you were a party to this.' ") (quoting Bob Brockhaus, director
of the Jefferson Smurfit Center for Entrepreneurial Studies at St. Louis University).
290 See Swanson & Roberts, supra note 286, at 109-10 (noting that recently plaintiffs
have increasingly returned to naming accountants in fraud cases and that about 89% of all postPSLRA securities class actions involve accusations of accounting fraud or insider trading).
291 See id. at 110 (questioning whether the PSLRA will fulfill its promise of limiting
exposure to secondary parties such as accountants and attomeys).
292 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2000).
293 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2000).
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aiders and abettors. 2 94 To prove liability, shareholders only had to prove that
secondary participants acted knowledgeably or recklessly in connection with a
primary violation and that the secondary participant provided substantial
assistance to the primary violator. 295 In 1994, the Supreme Court held in Central
Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver,296 that Congress did not
intend for shareholders to have a private right of action against aiders and abettors
under Section 10(b). 297 Accordingly, plaintiffs then had to allege and prove the
elements for a primary violation of Section 10(b) against defendants such as
accountants and attorneys who were involved in a sale of securities. These
elements are harder to plead and to prove: (1) misrepresentation; (2) duty; (3)
scienter; (4) materiality; (5) reliance; and (6) injury. 29 8 These changes were
codified in 1995 with the passage of the Private Securities Litigation Reform
300
Act, 299 which also increased the pleading standard for violations of lOb-5.
After 1995, secondary parties such as securities attorneys could be granted
motions to dismiss lawsuits when the plaintiff did not meet the heightened
pleading standard for alleging that the attorney had the requisite "scienter" or
intent to defraud. 30 1 However, the Circuit Courts of Appeals have disagreed on
2
how stringent the PSLRA's pleading standard is.30

294 See

SEC v. Nat'l Student Mktg. Corp., 457 F. Supp. 682, 716 (D.D.C. 1978) (finding

attorney-director a primary participant and outside attorney and law firm secondary participants
in securities laws violations).
295 See id. at 712 (articulating the test as having three prongs: (1) a primary participant
must have committed a securities law violation; (2) the aider and abettor must have been
generally aware of improper activity; and (3) the aider and abettor must have knowingly and
substantially assisted the violation).
296 511 U.S. 164, 191 (1994) (disallowing a private cause of action for aiding and abetting
against the indenture trustee in connection with a bond offering).
297 See Patterson, supra note 120, at 648 ("As a consequence of the Central Bank
decision, anyone sued in a private action under Section 10(b) must be sued as a primary, and
not a secondary, violator.").
298 Rothman v. Gregor, 220 F.3d 81, 89 (2d Cir. 2000).
299 Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995)
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u (2000)).
300 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (2000) ("[T]he complaint shall ... state with particularity
facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state of mind.").
301 See James A. Kassis, The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995: A Review
of Its Key Provisions and an Assessment of Its Effects at the Close of 2001, 26 SETON HALL
LEGIS. J. 1 19, 141 (2001) (commenting that the PSLRA requires that "state of mind," when an
element of the cause of action, be pled with specificity).
302 See Swanson & Roberts, supra note 286, at 114-15 (chronicling the split in the circuit
courts, with the Ninth Circuit on one end of the pleading spectrum, the Second and Third
Circuits on the other end, and the Fifth, Sixth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits holding the middle
ground).
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Because the most difficult element of a 1Ob-5 action, scienter, is very difficult
to prove in the case of a secondary party, most securities attorneys are. less at risk
of being named in a securities lawsuit and certainly less at risk of being found
30 3
liable in such a lawsuit after CentralBank and the enactment of the PSLRA.
However, at least in some federal circuits, an attorney may lose this comfort by
virtue of owning equity in an issuer client. In the Second Circuit, which includes
the Southern District of New York, where many shareholder suits, particularly
IPO lawsuits, are filed, including in the pleading the fact that the attorney
defendant owned issuer stock may be sufficient for a lOb-5 lawsuit to survive a
motion to dismiss. 30 4 Although that fact alone is not sufficient to prove a

violation, it does prove that the attorney defendant had motive and opportunity to
commit securities fraud, which will satisfy the Second Circuit's requirement that
the plaintiffs plead facts that give a "strong inference" of the required state of
mind. 30 5 However, although the Third Circuit30 6 has followed the Second Circuit,
the Ninth Circuit, which includes the Northern District of California, has
construed the PSLRA as requiring that the plaintiffs plead sufficient facts that
"constitute strong circumstantial evidence" of intent and as requiring more than
facts alleging motive and opportunity to survive a motion to dismiss. 30 7 The Fifth
Circuit has maintained a middle ground, 308 but will in all likelihood have the
opportunity to speak on this issue in Newby v. Enron Corp.,309 in which two law
3 10
firms have been named as defendants.

303 This theoretical decline in risk has mostly proved to be valid. Although securities fraud
cases have been filed against both VA Linux and Webvan, two of Wilson Sonsini's largest
client-investments, Wilson Sonsini was not named as a defendant in either lawsuit. Cf id. at
120 (noting that after Central Bank abolished aiding and abetting liability and the PSLRA
adopted proportionate liability, accountants have had reduced liability in securities fraud cases).
304
See Patterson, supra note 120, at 660 ("In the Second and Third Circuits . . . an
investment in the client by the attorney will probably be enough to pass this test."); see also In
re Scholastic Corp. Sec. Litig., 252 F.3d 63, 74 (2d Cir. 2001) (holding that facts surrounding
the sale of stock by the company president during time of misstatements were sufficient to
plead motive and opportunity to commit securities fraud under IOb-5).
305 See In re Scholastic, 252 F.3d at 74 (holding that facts detailing company president's
motive and opportunity to profit from the fraud as sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss).
30 6
See Swanson & Roberts, supra note 286, at 114 (stating that the Third Circuit has
lined up with the Second Circuit and citing In re Adavanta Securities Litigation, 180 F.3d 525
(3d Cir. 1999)).
307 See Patterson, supra note 120, at 659 (citing In re Silicon Graphics Inc. Securities

Litigation, 183 F.3d 970 (9th Cir. 1999)).
308
See Swanson & Roberts, supranote 286, at 115 (describing the Fifth Circuit as having
an interim approach and citing Nathenson v. Zonagen Inc., 267 F.3d 400 (5th Cir. 2001)).
309 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5908 (S.D. Tex. 2001).

310 See infra Part VI.A (discussing the treatment of accounting firms and law firms in the
wake of the Enron bankruptcy).
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In securities fraud cases in which the attorney does not own securities in the
issuer, scienter has been almost impossible to prove. 3 11 Most securities attorneys
with a stable of clients do not have a motive to participate in fraud in connection
with a securities offering. When an attorney is seen as independent from the
client, with independent economic incentives, then a judge is unlikely to infer that
an attorney would have the requisite intent to permit recovery in a lawsuit.
However, if the attorney stood to gain enormous sums of money in the securities
offering, then the attorney now automatically has motive, which may be used to
infer scienter. 312 As someone granted stock or stock options earlier for free or at
cheap prices, the attorney's incentives are aligned with the issuer and the early
investors, not with the prospective shareholders. 3 13 An attorney in this situation
will benefit from a higher selling price, making the attorney's interest inconsistent
with the buyers in the securities offering.
Even if the facts would not support a judgment against an attorney, having to
defend a securities lawsuit can be very costly. If the plaintiffs cause of action
against the attorney survives a motion to dismiss, then expensive discovery will
commence and the settlement value of the case increases. 3 14 Although the
PSLRA abolished joint and several liability under 1Ob-5, 3 15 law firms may find
themselves paying out large sums to settle these cases to minimize the overall
economic drain.
In an extreme case, an attorney with a large equity stake who is very involved
in many aspects of a client's business may be named in a shareholder suit as a
controlling person under Section 15 of the Securities Act of 1933 or Section 20 of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Although courts have been disinclined to
consider attorneys as controlling persons, evidence of a large equity percentage
and a relationship in which an unsophisticated client relied on the attorney's
advice in nonlegal matters may aid a plaintiff in overcoming that bias.3 16
311 See Patterson, supra note 120, at 655 (showing that a lawyer paid by the hour has little

economic incentive to perpetrate fraud on the client's investors).
312 See Baker, supra note 7, at 39 (citing Brian Redding of ALAS as warning that if an
attorney's primary defense in a securities fraud case is scienter, then the attorney will lose if the
case goes to the jury and the attorney appears closely aligned with the client).
313 See Miller, supra note 107, at 455 (citing Robert E. O'Malley et al., Preventing Legal
Malpractice in Large Law Firns,C641 A.L.I./A.B.A. 133 (1991)) (advising never to invest in
pre-IPO stock if also representing the issuer in the IPO because windfall profits may create a
conflict of interest with other investors).
314 See Kassis, supra note 301, at 124 (describing the discovery process in a securities
fraud case as "financial blood letting" designed to extort defendants into settling regardless of
the merits of the case).
315 See id. at 144 (applauding the Act for adopting proportionate liability for defendants
who act recklessly, but not knowingly, and therefore eliminating the incentive for plaintiffs to
name marginally culpable defendants who have "deep pockets").
316 See Patterson, supra note 120, at 662-63 (noting that courts are more likely to find
control in a public offering scenario). Lawyers who also are directors, even without holding
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In addition, new legislation introduced in both the House and the Senate
seeks to expand the liability of secondary violators such as accountants and
lawyers by repealing the PSLRA and reversing Central Bank.3 17 Lobbyists that
fought against the PSLRA are now using the accounting scandals to energize
Congress to change the provisions that may insulate the accounting firms and law
firms from liability. 3 18 Specifically, these bills seek to reinstate aider and abettor
liability, joint and several liability, and lower pleading standards. 3 19 Although this
legislation may not become law, it certainly reflects a nationwide desire to hold
accountants and attorneys liable for some of the nation's financial ills.
VII. A CAUTIONARY FLE TALE
One argument that law firms make to support taking client equity is that
when the practice gained momentum, creating investment opportunities was
necessary to compete in an environment where junior associates could easily go
320
to work for start-up clients and receive lucrative stock option packages.
Attorneys are also quick to point out that other professionals, such as investment
bankers, routinely take equity in clients, and often the entire investment bank's
fee will be contingent on the closing of the transaction. 32 1 Attorneys have also
referred to the growing trend in multidisciplinary practice among accounting
firms as a reason to revamp and become more of a "one-stop shopping" center for
clients. 32 2 However, after recent events have called accounting firms' "one-stop
stock, may be liable as a controlling person along with other directors. See id. at 662. In the late
1990s, many Silicon Valley attorneys were taking both stock and board positions in their
clients. See Osborne, supra note 138, at 73 (reporting that in 1996, three VLG partners were
board members of start-up clients).
317 See, e.g., Investor Protection Act of 2002, S. 1933, 107th Cong. (2002) (introduced by
Sen. Richard C. Shelby (R.-Ala.)).
318 See Carrie Johnson, FightRenewed over Limits on Investor Suits, WASH. POST, May
10, 2002, at El (quoting Sally Greenberg, senior counsel at Consumers Union, which was
opposed to the 1995 bill, as saying "Our nightmare has come true" with regard to the numerous
financial scandals and corporate earnings restatements); John Shipman, Fund Group Head
Urges Congress to Act on Accounting Reform, WALL ST. J., July 9, 2002, http://online.wsj.com/
article/0,,BTCO_20020709_005122,00.html?mod=INDUSTRY
(subscription
required)
(describing the mutual fund industry's lobbying arm, Investment Company Institute, as urging
Congress to pass reform legislation).
3 19
See S. 1933, 107th Cong. §§ 2-5.
320
See Orenstein, supra note 100 (citing attorneys at VLG as arguing that client equity is
a necessary associate retention tool); Howard, supra note 68 (citing attorneys as bemoaning the
defection of associates with "flat base salaries" to the "dot-com world").
321 Gilson, supranote 173, at 299.
322 See Bryant G. Garth & Carole Silver, The MDP Challenge in the Context of
Globalization, 52 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 903, 924 (2002) (stating that MDPs challenge
lawyers' dominance as professional service advisors to the business industry).
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shopping" practices into question, the accounting profession provides us not with
a pattern to emulate, but with a cautionary tale.

A. What About Those Nice Public Accountants?
Public accounting firms have always prided themselves on being independent
from their many clients. 323 Because of their independence, accountants have
served the same reputational intermediary function as corporate counsel in
transactions such as public offerings and mergers and acquisitions. 324 These "Big
Five" firms, down from "Big Eight" and "Big Six" due to mergers, serve many
clients each and therefore are presumed to safeguard their reputations over any
single client. Accountants issue comfort letters and vouch for the veracity of
audited financial statements of their clients. 32 5 To protect the sanctity of the
public audit, accounting firms have always prohibited accountants from owning
326
stock in clients.
In the 1990s, the large public accounting firms began to experiment with
expanding into both business consulting and the provision of legal services. The
reasons for doing so parallel the reasons why law firms sought to transform
themselves into venture capitalist law firms: accounting firms could not remain
profitable simply by leveraging junior auditors and increasing workload. 327 In the
United States, 328 ethical rules were problematic for lawyers who wanted to work
for multidisciplinary firms, so the trend of integrating legal services into
accounting firms stalled somewhat in that arena. 329 However, the business

323

See Kostant, supra note 4, at 60 (comparing the legal profession's misplaced concern

with client confidentiality with accountants' disclosure duties, which reflect accountants'
obligations to the investing public, not to the employment relationship).
324 See Gilson, supra note 173, at 290.
325 See id. at 291 (comparing the auditor's comfort letter with the legal opinion).
326 See Miller, supra note 107, at 446 (stating that accountants cannot hold equity in
auditing clients under the rules of both the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
and the SEC). Another safeguard of the independence of accountants has been the requirement
that issuers disclose the firing or withdrawal of independent auditors on Form 8-K. See 17
C.F.R. § 229.304 (giving instructions to issuers on disclosing the resignation of independent
accountants and whether any disagreement between the accountants and the issuer preceded the
resignation). The new SEC rules implementing the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 propose to
create an analogous "noisy withdrawal" for attorneys. See infra, Part VI.C. n.233.
327 Garth & Silver, supra note 322, at 921.
328 See id. at 903 (noting that laws of other countries permit attorneys to. practice in
multidisciplinary firms).
329
See id.
(stating that until U.S. ethical rules are changed, a Big Five firm would have to
try to compete in the legal services market through an offshore entity, with little chance of
success).
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consulting activities of accounting firms exploded. 330 Although some firms
formed separate business entities to conduct these activities, other firms provided
both consulting advice and auditing services under the same umbrella.33 1
Recent cases have highlighted the inherent conflicts of interest in accounting
firms providing both auditing services and consulting services. 332 However,
public attention became more focused on the conflict when Arthur Andersen's
auditing services to Enron Corp. began to be: suspect. 333 Because Andersen
earned more from consulting services provided to Enron than from its auditing
services, its motivations to conduct an eagle-eye audit were instantly suspect in
light of Enron's "earnings management" accounting practices. 334 Andersen
subsequently lost in a criminal trial for obstruction of justice and then was told by
the SEC that it had lost its ability to provide public audits. Legislation was quickly
introduced in Congress to prohibit any accounting firm from auditing a client that
is also a business consulting client.335 The independence that the accounting
profession so fiercely guarded was destroyed in a matter of months once hidden
conflicts surfaced arising from the double role that accounting firms were trying
336
to perform.
The legal profession is in danger of having the spotlight turn on it with the
same intensity. The relationships that attorneys are cultivating in which the
attorney is the business consultant, venture capitalist, and legal advisor may also

330

See Deogun & MacDonald, supra note 76 (reporting that KPMG International advised

on 524 mergers and acquisitions in 1999, making it the leader that year, with
PriceWaterhouseCoopers the sixth firm in terms of numbers of mergers and acquisitions and
Ernst & Young the sixteenth).
331 Although KPMG consulted through the same entity, PriceWaterhouseCoopers held a
subsidiary that was a registered broker-dealer. In an effbrt to separate auditing and consulting
activities, this subsidiary is to be acquired by 113M Corp. for $3.5 million. See William M.
Bulkeley & Kemba Dunham, IBM Speeds Move to Consulting with $3.5 Billion Acquisition,
WALL ST. J., July 31, 2002, at Al.
332 KPMG, L.L.P. v. SEC, 289 F.3d 109, 126 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (upholding SEC cease and
desist order because the consulting arm of KPMG was accepting success fees that threatened
the independence of its auditing services).
333 ENRON REPORT, supra note 11, at 10 (concluding that Arthur Andersen did not
provide objective and critical professional advice to Enron).
334 Coffee, Berle & Flom Testimony, supra note 12 (testifying that in 2000, Enron paid
$25 million in audit fees to Arthur Andersen, but $27 million in nonaudit fees).
335 Auditor Independence Act of 2002, S. 1896, 107th Cong. (2002) (introduced by Sen.
Barbara Boxer, D-Cal.).
336 This double role also served to destroy accounting firms' leverage when trying to
convince issuers to make disclosures: the noisy exit. An issuer could threaten to fire an
annoying auditor from the lucrative consulting payroll, a move that would not require an SEC
disclosure.
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seem questionable under the same scrutiny. 337 The legal profession has already
felt the bursting of the economic bubble in declining revenue, forcing the once
overloaded Silicon Valley firms to slim down their ranks. 338 Layoffs and belttightening may not be the only negative results that the legal profession will suffer
during the economic downturn. If one large case surfaces in which the "one-stopshopping" law firm may have disregarded its professional duty in the face of a
conflict of interest, then the entire legal profession may suffer in the same way
that the accounting profession has suffered.
B. The View from the Crucible
For the accounting industry, the witch hunt has already begun. With each
restatement of earnings that is announced by a public corporation, a new
shareholder lawsuit is filed, often naming the accountants as defendants in
addition to the issuer. 339 Much as the nation saw with the savings and loan crisis
of the 1980s, 340 the third party professionals will be under attack as the primary
participants go bankrupt and lose economic value as defendants.
The legal profession will be watching closely to see what happens to the
lawyers in these cases. So far, few law firms have been named. However,
attention is being focused on whether the law firms named in the Enron cases will
be held liable under the new pleading standards of the PSLRA. 34 1 Should that
happen, then a new wave of cases will sweep the nation. Moreover, if a wave of
cases happens to unearth windfall profits made by attorneys with lucrative stock
options, then the media glare will turn from the accounting profession to the legal
profession.

337 See Garth & Silver, supra note 322, at 907-08 (remarking that Vinson & Elkins'
actions in the Enron scandal paralleled those of Arthur Andersen's and constituted lending its
reputation to Enron in return for the promise of continued legal work).
338 See, e.g., Lashinsky, supra note 73, at 134 (chronicling the slowdown of work at
Cooley, Godward, which laid off about 100 attorneys in 2002).
339
See Swanson & Roberts, supra note 286, at 109-10 (reporting a continued increase of
post-PSLRA filings alleging accounting irregularities or accounting fraud).
340
See Howard, supra note 68 (noting that attorneys fear a replay of the savings and loan
debacle in which investors looked to attorneys as stakeholders); Claybrook Testimony, supra
note 287 (testifying that the savings and loan scandal could not have occurred without the
assistance of the lawyers and the accountants).
341 See Claybrook Testimony, supra note 287 (noting that Vinson & Elkins and Kirkland
& Ellis have each cited the CentralBank decision in their Motions to Dismiss).
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VIII. So, WHADDAYA GONNA Do ABoLu" IT?

A. Disclosure
One proposal to attempt to counteract the public's misplaced trust in an
attorney or law firm that invests in a client is to require disclosure of this fact in
the legal opinion issued in connection with a securities offering. Although certain
attorney-investors will be required to make disclosures if they own a large
percentage of the equities of the client or fall into certain categories of persons, 342
most investors will not be aware of those SEC filings. In addition, many attorneyinvestors will not be required to file anything with the SEC However, if the law
firm legal opinion contained a disclosure of equity investment, then the investing
public could make its own informed decision as to whether the law firm could
adequately perform its reputational intermediary function and gatekeeping
function.
B. ABA Guidelines
Another proposal, albeit a much more far-reaching one, would be for the
ABA to promulgate rules that limit that investment to a certain percentage. 343 If
the taking of an equity interest creates a conflict of interest, then the smaller the
equity interest, the smaller the conflict. 344 The percentage of equity that an
attorney holds will not necessarily reflect the absolute dollar amount of the
interest, but it can serve as a rough benchmark. In addition, the smaller the
percentage of equity that an attorney holds, the smaller the influence that the
attorney should have over the business decisions made by management.3 45
To eliminate any equity-induced conflict, of course, the ABA could also
promulgate an ethical rule that would prohibit the practice of taking equity in a
client altogether. This action is highly unlikely and may also overly restrict
attorney-client relations. The ABA could prohibit individual members of a law
firm to hold investments, however, and allow only the law firm to make client
342 See 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a)(1) (2000) (requiring officers, directors and owners of ten

percent or more of the outstanding securities of an issuer to file a statement with the Securities
and Exchange Commission).
343 See ABCNY Op., supra note 104 (listing as a factor that should be considered in
determining whether an equity interest is an excessive fee "the percentage amount of the
interest, and what, if any, degree of control it provides the lawyer over the business") (quoting
Utah Bar Assoc. Op. 98-13 (1998)).
344 See Patterson, supra note 120, at 668-69 (suggesting that attorneys limit liability and
avoid the appearance of aiding and abetting securities fraud by minimizing the actual amount of
the investment because that way an attorney will be seen as having little to gain from the fraud).
345 See id. at 668 (noting that the percentage amount of equity that an attorney holds will

determine whether the attorney can be seen as a "controlling person" under securities laws).
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investments. 34 6 The risk of an individual attorney having a conflict with the
issuer's long-term goals would then be reduced as no individual attorney would
have a large stake in the outcome of the issue. Any unethical behavior due to a
conflict of interest would necessarily take place on the individual level; the
individual attorney may not have a long-term interest in maintaining the
independent reputation of the law firm and therefore may be motivated to cheat to
realize short-term gain. Relieving that individual attorney from that conflict
would take away the motivation to behave unethically or to violate any securities
laws.
IX. CONCLUSION

The legal profession is in danger. Continually attacked in popular culture as
greedy, unethical, and amoral, lawyers already suffer from a public relations
problem. However, a new source of discontentment with the legal profession is
brewing. 347 Watching their retirement accounts dwindle while the business
industry is rocked with reports of corporate malfeasance and creative
accounting, 348 Americans are beginning to suspect everyone who participated in
selling overpriced securities to the public. Shareholder lawsuits are papering the
courthouses, often naming accounting firms as participants in the securities fraud.
The accounting industry is suffering, as one of the oldest auditing firms, which
historically was famous for its independence, becomes "a symbol of corroded
ethics." 349 Attorneys are nervously commenting on the happenings, trying to
remain mere observers to a car crash when in fact many attorneys can be
described as being in the front passenger seat just moments before the collision.
If media scrutiny turns from the accounting profession to the legal profession,
it may expose the profession's vulnerable Achilles' heel: the fact that in many of
these deals that are imploding, the issuer's attorney accepted substantial amounts
of equity as a part of the representation. In employment law seminars, attorneys
always counsel business clients that off-color jokes always seem innocuous and
funny to everyone until they are repeated in front of a jury. Equity deals may also
seem innocuous and mutually beneficial until described in front of the same jury.
346

See id. at 666-67 (suggesting that individual attorneys not hold private investments in

their clients).
347 See Claybrook Testimony, supra note 287 (arguing that lawyers and accountants drive
corporate fraud and should be held accountable).
348 See id. ("The financial horror show that the American public has watched unfold
across the corporate landscape over the past few months is nothing less than a corporate crime
wave of epic proportions.").
349 lanthe Jeanne Dugan, Auditing Old-Timers Recall When Prestige Was the Bottom
Line, WALL ST. J., July 15, 2002, at AI (quoting Al Bows, one of the oldest living Big Five
auditors, as saying "[Arthur Andersen] would be disgusted with what these guys did to his
company.").
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The conflicts that equity fees create, and the potential liability for those conflicts,
warn against engaging in this practice. Although the ABA Model Rules do not
prohibit the practice, changes should be made to ethical rules either to forbid the
practice or to restrict the amount of equity involved to an insignificant amount,
reducing the conflicts that arise in these situations to the usual conflicts inherent in
any fee arrangement. Practitioners should also police themselves and forego what
seems like a lucrative opportunity but what could be a ticking time bomb.

